



Joint Military Intelligence College




International Intelligence Forum 2005

Africa

Report Documentation Page				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE JUN 2005		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED 00-00-2005 to 00-00-2005	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE International Intelligence Forum 2005, Africa: Perspectives on Multinational Intelligence Cooperation in Africe				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Defense Intelligence Agency, Joint Military Intelligence College, Washington, DC, 20340				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Same as Report (SAR)	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 196	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

The Joint Military Intelligence College's International Intelligence Fellows Program is a two-week executive course designed to enhance intelligence cooperation and strengthen relationships between the United States and among participating nations. The program seeks to bolster regional security cooperation by providing a forum where senior military and civilian intelligence officials gather to exchange ideas, explore pressing issues, and achieve a greater understanding of intelligence challenges. The program uses a variety of approaches to explore pertinent issues, including discussion panels, executive exercises, and case studies. The program focuses on world regions, with each iteration addressing a different part of the world. To date we have hosted two conferences focusing on European intelligence issues and one centered on the Asian security environment. This publication highlights some of the issues, findings, and perspectives that emerged from discussions in June 2005 among the Fellows who this year addressed multinational intelligence cooperation in Africa.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "A. Denis Clift". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "A." and last name "Clift" clearly legible.

A. Denis Clift
President
Joint Military Intelligence College

The International Intelligence *Forum* publishes articles, letters or extended comments from International Intelligence Fellows past, present and future, as well as from other participants in the program, to make this a true forum for the thoughtful discussion of international intelligence cooperation. Please send your written contributions for incorporation into future editions of the *Forum* to Russell.Swenson@dia.mil, Director of the JMIC Center for Strategic Intelligence Research. This publication has been cleared for public release by the Office of Security Review of the Department of Defense.

In this publication, comments attributed to participants have been reviewed by those individuals, but their views and comments should not be taken to represent the official policy or position of the Department of Defense of the U.S. Government, nor of any other government represented by the International Intelligence Fellows or other contributors.

**PERSPECTIVES ON MULTINATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION
IN AFRICA**

**INTERNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE FELLOWS
PROGRAM
June 2005**

**Joint Military Intelligence College
Washington, DC**

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Gen Mackenzie, VADM Jacoby, MajGen Adu-Amanfoh, President Clift and the 2005 International Intelligence Fellows

Front Row (Left to Right):

COL Shepherd (USCENTCOM JTF-HOA), Mr. Rhett Scott (USCENTCOM), Gen Mackenzie (Angola), VADM L.E. Jacoby (Director, DIA), MajGen Adu-Amanfoh (Ghana), Mr. A. Denis Clift (President, JMIC), Col Handouleh (Djibouti), LtCol Diarra (Mali)

Middle Row (Left to Right):

Mr. Stejskal (Dept of State), Col Hamidou (Niger), LtCol Kigotho (Kenya), Col Randrianarivelo (Madagascar), Col Ocran (Ghana), LtCol Mugira (Uganda), GP CAPT Dangana (Nigeria), Mr. Moboe Henri-Leopold (Cameroon), Col Dikobe (Botswana), Mr. Larry Hiponia (JMIC)

Back Row (Left to Right):

CDR Parker, (USEUCOM), Ms. Trisha Bacon Gonzalez (Dept of State), Mr. Eli Sasaran (DIA), CDR Hugar, (JMIC)


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Mr. Larry Hiponia Program Director


The production and publication of these proceedings would not have been possible without the tireless dedication and sustained effort of the International Intelligence Fellows Program Working Group. The staff and faculty contributors to the working group were directly responsible for the outstanding success and the continued growth of the Fellows Program. Additionally, the students from the Joint Military Intelligence College Class of 2005 played an integral role in these proceedings by serving as recorders and providing a comprehensive record of seminar discussions. Special thanks go to Commander Wayne Hugar, USN for writing and producing this publication. Additional thanks go to Dr. Russell Swenson, Dr. Elizabeth Pickering, Dr. Orlando Pacheco, and Ms. Katie Kolowich for their valuable contributions in editing and assisting in the design of this publication.

Finally, each International Intelligence Fellow should be recognized for their candor, insight, and innovation. The Fellows worked diligently and approached the curriculum with frankness, openness, and enthusiasm. As a result, the International Fellows identified key regional security concerns and proposed novel solutions to contemporary intelligence cooperation issues. The Fellows identified a strategic roadmap for the future and embraced the possibility of an African continent characterized by multilateral relationships.

International Intelligence Fellows Program
Joint Military Intelligence College



17 June - 1 July 2005 - Washington DC



**“PERSPECTIVES ON MULTINATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION IN AFRICA”**

Program Circular

PERSPECTIVES ON MULTINATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION IN AFRICA

**Commander Wayne Hugar, USN
Curriculum Coordinator**

PROGRAM OVERVIEW

During June 2005, the Joint Military Intelligence College conducted the fourth iteration of its International Intelligence Fellows Program. The purpose of the Fellows Program is to provide a forum for senior leaders to exchange ideas and explore key regional and intelligence issues in an academic and non-attribution setting. Senior military officers and civilian leaders from the U.S. and regional countries are invited each year to participate in two weeks of seminar discussions, debates, case studies, and a notional crisis planning exercise. The three previous International Fellows Programs focused on Europe and Asia and through cooperative frameworks identified opportunities and impediments to multinational security and intelligence cooperation within each diverse region. The fourth program shifted the focus to Africa, a region of the world where multinational security and intelligence capabilities and structures are developing in dynamic and promising ways. Although the notion of multilateral intelligence cooperation is in its infancy in Africa, various issues were identified during the two-week program that provide a framework for further progress in shaping the future of regional security and intelligence cooperation on the continent. This issue of the *International Intelligence Forum* brings together key conclusions and recommendations from the 2005 International Intelligence Fellows Program.

Twelve international and six U.S. Fellows participated in the 2005 program. Countries sending representatives were Angola, Botswana, Cameroon, Djibouti, Ghana (two participants), Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Uganda. Five U.S. intelligence entities were represented by six participants: the U.S. European Command, the U.S. Central Command, U.S. Central Command—Joint Task Force Horn of Africa, the U.S. Department of State (two participants), and the Defense Intelligence Agency.

CURRICULUM OUTLINE

The International Intelligence Fellows curriculum was divided into four distinct phases: “Intelligence perspectives from the region,” “Transnational security and intelligence issues,” “Intelligence capabilities in a multinational framework,” and “Prospects for multinational intelligence cooperation in Africa.” The first week of the program addressed key security issues that impact the African continent. Specific topics included:

- African security concerns
- U.S. strategic security and intelligence interests in Africa
- Terrorism and transnational issues

- Medical intelligence and transnational medical threats
- Complexities of multinational operations
- Geospatial-intelligence support to humanitarian crises
- Intelligence capabilities in a multinational framework: a UN perspective

These issues were highlighted because they impact almost every country on the African continent, and more importantly, because effective intelligence cooperation can mitigate serious regional problems and multiply the effectiveness of the numerous multinational operations in Africa. Once these issues were defined, participants had a common departure point for the discussion of intelligence cooperation.

The theme of the second week of the curriculum was “Prospects for multinational intelligence cooperation in Africa,” taking into account the perspectives of individual countries of Africa, the U.S. European Command, the U.S. Central Command, and the Department of Defense. Having identified regional and transnational security issues during week one, the International Fellows discussed and debated U.S. security perspectives and concerns in Africa as articulated by U.S. Ambassadors Johnnie Carson, Michael Ranneberger and David Shinn; General Charles Wald, USAF, Deputy Commander, U.S. European Command; and others. Using the lessons learned from the discussions generated by guest speakers and seminar discussions, the Fellows participated in a notional crisis action planning exercise designed to showcase intelligence cooperation in action. The exercise used a United Nations peacekeeping operation scenario and tasked the Fellows to devise a multinational intelligence plan for it. The culmination of the two-week curriculum was a course synthesis seminar, “The Way Ahead.” For this, the Fellows were divided into three groups of equal size, with membership randomly determined, to brainstorm ideas with respect to international intelligence cooperation in Africa. The first two groups of Fellows focused on opportunities for and impediments to intelligence cooperation, respectively. The third group of Fellows was tasked to describe the current state of cooperation and their “ideal” vision of cooperation 10 years into the future. In addition, this group was challenged to identify key enablers to bridge the gap between cooperation “now” and that likely 10 years in the future.

The International Intelligence Fellows Program takes place in an atmosphere of mutual respect, transparency, and non-attribution. Mutual respect is an essential aspect of the program, since the African continent is an area of great diversity and differences in cultural background, ethnicity, religion, and stages of economic development. Transparency is another key component of the Fellows Program. Although all program participants are intelligence professionals, its main purpose is neither intelligence exchange nor intelligence collection. Rather, the Fellows Program seeks to promote meaningful discussion and dialogue on relevant intelligence issues impacting the region. In order to facilitate frank and forthright discussions, the Fellows were requested to adhere to the program guidelines of transparency. Transparency in turn builds confidence and fosters future cooperation with the U.S. and among regional allies. Finally, in order to ensure an environment conducive to candid and open discussion, a policy of non-attribution was in effect during the entire program. Therefore,

comments in these proceedings will not be directly attributed to a specific International Fellow. Where a participant's name has been used, that individual has specifically approved the release of material associated with his or her name. No distinction will be made between International and U.S. Fellows except when the individual's perspective is essential in understanding the context of the discussion.

The first portion of these proceedings provides a summary of key points made by various distinguished speakers when addressing the International Fellows. Additionally, an overview of the Fellows' discussion that followed each guest speaker is provided. The second portion summarizes key conclusions and recommendations with respect to intelligence cooperation in Africa. These conclusions are based on the results of two major group exercises that required the Fellows to articulate a consensus viewpoint derived from group deliberations.



Vice Admiral Jacoby discusses regional security and intelligence issues with the International Fellows



Vice Admiral Jacoby continues the discussion.

INTERNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE FELLOWS PROGRAM CURRICULUM

WEEK ONE: DEFINING THE ISSUES

Day One: Opening Remarks

- Mr. A. Denis Clift, President, Joint Military Intelligence College
- Ambassador Johnnie Carson, Senior Vice President, National Defense University
- Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, USN, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
- Ambassador Michael Ranneberger, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Africa Bureau

Day Two: African Country Perspectives

- Briefings on intelligence issues by African Fellows from Angola, Botswana, Cameroon, Djibouti, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Uganda

Day Three: U.S. Command Perspectives

- U.S. European Command Security and Theater Engagement Issues in Africa: General Charles Wald, USAF, Deputy Commander (VTC)
- Strategic Intelligence Issues in Africa: Defense Intelligence Agency
- U.S. European Command J-2 Intelligence Issues: Commander Ron Parker, USN
- U.S. Central Command J-2 Intelligence Issues: Mr. Daniel Morris, Assistant J-2
- Geospatial Intelligence Support: National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency

Day Four: Terrorism and Transnational Security Issues

- Strategic Security Issues in Africa: Ambassador David Shinn
- Global War on Terrorism Panel Discussion
 - Ambassador John Dinger, Department of State
 - Colonel John Mabe, USAF, Department of Defense
- Transnational Medical Threats Briefing: Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC)
- Small Group Exercise: Identifying Regional Security Concerns in Africa

Day Five: Complexities of Multinational Operations

- His Excellency Dr. Zac Nsenga, Rwandan Ambassador to the U.S.
- Role of the Private Sector in Peacekeeping Operations: Mr. Doug Brooks, President, International Peacekeeping Operations Association
- U.S. Combined Joint Task Force Planning and Pre-deployment Considerations:

- ❑ General George Joulwan, USA (Ret.)
- ❑ Major General Bill Nash, USA (Ret.)
- Mr. Kent Brokenshire, Department of State
- Multinational Information Technology: Ms. Eileen Vidrine, JMIC

WEEK TWO: PROSPECTS FOR MULTINATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION IN AFRICA-THE WAY AHEAD

Day Six: Intelligence Capabilities in a Multinational Framework

- United Nations Intelligence capabilities for Peacekeeping Operations:
 - ❑ Colonel Nick Seymour, UK, United Nations, DPKO
- Intelligence Support to Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR):
 - ❑ Mr. Mark Malan, Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center
- Information Support to Conflict Management and Reconstruction:
 - ❑ Dr. Sharon Morris, U.S. Agency for International Development
- Group Exercise: Intelligence in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (notional)
- Participant Discussion with Executive Panel

Day Seven: Pentagon Day

- U.S. Joint Staff and Intelligence J-2 Brief: Brigadier General Dettmer, USAF
- U.S. Security Interests in Africa: Ms. Theresa Whelan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs
- Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations: Dr. Jeffrey “Jeb” Nadaner
- Pentagon Tour

Day Eight: CIA and State Department Day

- CIA Visit and Briefings
- U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research Briefing
- U.S. Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs, Mr. Mike Bittrick
- U.S. Department of State, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement, Small Arms and Light Weapons (SA/LW), Director, Mr. Richard Kidd

Day Nine: Program Synthesis—The Way Ahead

- Multinational Intelligence and Information Sharing Panel Discussion-A United Nations Perspective:
 - ❑ Brigadier General Francois Dureau, France (Ret.)

- Colonel Richard Manlove, USA (Ret.)
- Small Group Exercise: Cooperation Now and Cooperation in the Future; Defining the Way Ahead
- Participant Discussion with Executive Panel

Day Ten: Graduation

- Seminar Discussion: Final impressions—what have we learned?
- Graduation Address, Mr. A. Denis Clift, President, Joint Military Intelligence College



The 2005 International Intelligence Fellows visited the Central Intelligence Agency headquarters in Langley, Virginia on 29 June 2005

PART I

SETTING THE STAGE: PERSPECTIVES FROM CIVILIAN POLICYMAKERS AND SENIOR MILITARY LEADERS

Ambassador Johnnie Carson
Senior Vice President, National Defense University

Several speakers were asked to provide their overall analysis of security, intelligence, and cooperation in the region. Ambassador Johnnie Carson provided a perspective on U.S. interests in Africa. He prefaced his main remarks by recalling that during the Cold War, U.S. foreign policies focused on limiting the influence of communist countries and their access to strategic resources such as minerals. These policies allowed support for more authoritarian regimes, to include those in Africa. The Ambassador emphasized that greater work is needed on cooperation at all levels and that there is greater interest now among U.S. policymakers regarding hydrocarbons, anti-terrorism, and HIV/AIDS in Africa. In his view, the following issues need to be addressed:

PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY AND RULE OF LAW

There have been greater strides recently by African governments in their promotion of democracy and the rule of law, particularly respecting human rights abuse. Africa has also established prohibitions against coup-sponsored changes in government, with an eye to Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo, for example. In Guinea and Zimbabwe, the old guard is clinging to power. Overall, the judiciary systems remain the weakest institution among African countries.

ECONOMIC REFORM

Sustained economic reform and growth remains elusive for most African states. The World Bank recognizes Africa as the poorest and least integrated continent in the global economy, as resources are squandered and violence over oil continues. To assist, the U.S. Millennium Challenge Account will provide \$15 billion for Africa over the next few years.

GLOBAL TERRORISM

Even as global terrorism is the foremost issue for the United States, it is an African concern as well. The U.S. embassy bombings on 7 August 1998 in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi resulted in 240 deaths and injuries to over 5,000. Additional terrorist strikes are almost certain, and many places remain vulnerable to terrorist activity. Economic deprivation provides impetus for terrorism: Islam or Islamists are not the central issue or cause of the phenomenon.

PUBLIC HEALTH

Africa will not realize its economic potential if the HIV/AIDS pandemic is left unchecked. Africa has two-thirds of the 40 million AIDS cases worldwide. The number of AIDS orphans in Africa, currently at 11 million, will likely double by 2010.

TRADE

Africa's oil and gas resources account for 15 percent of U.S. hydrocarbon imports. This amount will likely increase 15-25 percent during the next five to ten years. In some categories of hydrocarbon product imports, Africa is more important than Russia and the states of the former USSR.

CONFLICT AND MEDIATION

The most notable and recent conflict in Africa rages in the Darfur region of Sudan. Over 65 percent of the UN Security Council's time is spent dealing with conflict issues in Africa. Two-thirds of UN peacekeeping time and resources are spent in Africa. Eight of 17 UN peacekeeping missions are in Africa, including the two largest. In July 1994, the United States undertook the largest humanitarian relief effort ever by contributing over \$850 million to East Africa's Great Lakes region. By comparison, the U.S. Agency for International Development's entire budget in 1994 was \$750 million. The U.S. Government also supported Kenya's mediation activity in the Inter-Government Agency for Development in northern Uganda and Khartoum, Sudan.

REGIONAL INTEGRATION

Artificial trade barriers must be reduced in Africa. Integration is required to link countries more closely, economically and politically. Integration is more likely to resolve problems peacefully. The United States with its 50 states, and the European Union with its 25 countries, provide examples of regional integration.

DISCUSSION

Following Ambassador Carson's remarks, the Fellows engaged in discussions stimulated by his presentation. One International Fellow commented that the U.S. focus on the Global War on Terrorism brings with it a tolerance of dictators. In response, Ambassador Carson cited U.S. government protests against the governments of Zimbabwe and Togo during recent periods of political tension in those two countries.

Responding to a comment made by an International Fellow about the need for poverty reduction in Africa, Ambassador Carson referred to the Bush Administration's establishment of the Millennium Challenge Account; its budget is expected to double from \$800 million to \$1.5 billion during the next few years. Ambassador Carson also mentioned that the U.S. Administration supports and funds the African Growth and Opportunity Act, which reduced tariffs and quota barriers on African textiles and some 5,000 other products. The Ambassador also mentioned that the Group of Eight leading industrial states (G-

8) recently adopted the Boyer Commission's debt relief proposals which, contingent upon specific reforms, will benefit 14 African countries. The Ambassador emphasized that reforms must be accompanied by appropriate fiscal policies on the part of aid recipient countries.

Another International Fellow commented that Somalia is a failed state and asked why has been so little U.S. attention to this issue. Ambassador Carson commented that certain individuals remain responsible for acts that undermine state viability and that one must be very careful and surgical against the perpetrators.

Focus then turned to British Prime Minister Tony Blair's recent proposal, in the Blair Commission Report, for increased financial assistance to Africa. An International Fellow commented that the United States approved of the Blair Commission Report, but did not commit to it. The Ambassador noted that the proposed seven percent GDP appropriation was prohibitive, given the United States' current financial commitments and multi-front war effort. However, U.S. assistance to Africa had doubled and aid is expected to rise slowly but steadily. Ambassador Carson also noted that while the African Union's New Economic Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) and the Blair Commission Report make demands on developed countries, they also make demands on developing countries. Experience in Ethiopia, for example, demonstrates that violence and unresolved election results do not generate financial support from the international community.



Ambassador Carson presents the opening address to the 2005 International Intelligence Fellows

Ambassador Michael E. Ranneberger
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Africa Bureau
U.S. Department of State

Ambassador Ranneberger spoke with the International Fellows about political, economic, and security issues in Africa from the perspective of the U.S. State Department. He emphasized that democracy and human rights are prerequisites for economic prosperity and stability in Africa. Other major factors influencing stability in Africa include:

- Health challenges
- Good governance
- Economic prosperity
- Counterterrorism

Ambassador Ranneberger observed that more emphasis is needed on conserving Africa's natural resource base, as a basis for good governance leading toward development. He highlighted examples of progress on this front, despite the prevalence of regional instability in Africa. For example, he noted that the peace settlement in the Sudan has become a case study for conflict resolution through multinational efforts. The African Union-led effort to resolve the conflict in Darfur, Sudan, was facilitated by peace talks held in Abuja, Nigeria. The transition process is progressing toward ending the conflict in East Africa's Great Lakes region, although the Manu River area has not experienced as much progress as desired. Of note, both Cote d'Ivoire and Guinea have unresolved problems.

Ambassador Ranneberger turned next to the global focus on terrorism and counterterrorism by noting that there is concern about Africa's porous borders, police infrastructure problems, and other factors which Al-Qaida is trying to exploit. However, the U.S.-supported East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative and the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative are holistic and are progressing in parallel with economic and educational development on the continent. The Ambassador also emphasized significant U.S. support for enhanced African Peacekeeping capabilities. For example, he noted that the U.S. African Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA) program will provide \$30–40 million in funding to participating African states during the next few years.

DISCUSSION

An International Fellow began the discussion session by asking whether the adage that "there are permanent interests but not permanent friends" applies to long-term U.S. foreign policy and commitment toward Africa. Ambassador Ranneberger responded that the United States remains consistent and that its partnerships are not taken lightly. The U.S. is working out its relationship to countries that are moving toward democracy, and there are broad criteria that are fairly consistent in guiding that process.

Another International Fellow mentioned that African state-owned companies are rapidly developing new oil resources, but this has produced many problems, including cor-

ruption. Corruption has meant diversion of resource revenues away from support of the populace, thus increasing poverty. He then asked Ambassador Ranneberger whether foreign pressure can force greater transparency in African governments. The Ambassador noted that the G-8 launched initiatives years ago to improve transparency in developing countries. For example, Nigeria has recently adopted a “transparency initiative,” consisting of hiring consultants to improve internal financial accountability. In addition, Chad and the World Bank are cooperating to monitor oil revenues derived from a newly established pipeline and the U.S. government is working with U.S.-based oil companies in Nigeria’s Niger Delta area toward the same end.

Another Fellow echoed the frequently heard complaint that U.S.-African relations are marked by conditions, for example, involving human rights. It seems these conditions are not applied equally to all countries. In response, the Ambassador noted that political realities dictate that U.S. policy may not always appear to be consistent, but the objective remains the same — to promote good governance.

An International Fellow mentioned that while there were U.S. diplomatic efforts to support the African Union, there was little engagement in building common institutions dedicated exclusively for conflict resolution. In response, the Ambassador noted that the majority of U.S. development funding was aimed at building the national capacity of government institutions in Africa.

Another International Fellow asked which was needed for Africa: more trade or more aid? In response the Ambassador said that both are needed. For example, there has been a 45 percent increase in African imports to the United States as a result of the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), passed in 2000 by the U.S. Congress, and accelerated in 2004. However, there is debate about the absorptive capacity of African states in terms of how they can use aid without creating collateral problems. Pouring in too much aid at once is problematic.

According to another International Fellow, the world-wide media blows out of proportion human rights issues attributed to some African governments. This media attention forces governments to eliminate bilateral training programs. In response, the Ambassador emphasized that although consistent values and principles characterize U.S. foreign policy, sometimes laws passed by the U.S. Congress contain legislative provisions that trigger sanctions against certain countries. One positive result was that the Rwandan Government recently submitted over 30 pages of comments in response to the latest U.S. State Department human rights report. Ambassador Ranneberger also noted that there is not a lot of lobbying by African countries in the U.S. Congress.

Following the departure of Ambassador Ranneberger, the International Fellows engaged in a group discussion which first centered on how Africans perceive U.S. views and policies and their concern over what they perceive to be double standards being applied with respect to some issues. They noted that the bending of conditions for certain countries caused confusion.

SECURITY AND TERRORISM

The discussion moderator then asked the group for their views on how vulnerable their countries are to terrorism. One International Fellow argued that his country was internally stable and not likely to experience terrorist attacks. However, he noted that terrorism is essentially imported to his country by radical elements and that his country's security forces needed to be vigilant. Another International Fellow commented that terrorism is a fact of life and that his country can be attacked. Still another International Fellow said that although his country is focused on combating illegal drug trafficking and promoting economic growth, it does not want to wait for an attack to happen. He concluded by asking the group how his country could participate in helping other countries fight terrorism.

One Fellow stated that his country is vulnerable to attack and that poverty and religious extremism are causes. He felt that no country is free from the terrorist threat. Another Fellow stated that combating terrorism is a multi-agency problem, not just for either the military or police. He also said that his country's army has taken the leading role in a joint effort to combat terrorism by forming anti-terrorist units.

One of the Fellows expressed concern about the potential threat from terrorism in the region where his country is located. He noted that hostile factions of a tribal group in a neighboring country, who might pose a threat to his country, were difficult to identify. Another Fellow opined that in his view, the main security problem for Africa is the stability of governments (peaceful succession). He noted that there is increased resistance by Africans against those who would take power by force.

One International Fellow observed that security and intelligence priorities differ according to local circumstances. He noted that terrorism has localized expression in the northern part of a neighboring country. He sees a need for the continent to compile a database of hostile groups. Finally, he noted that HIV/AIDS is a big threat affecting the level of preparedness of military forces, in addition to its devastating effects on economies. Another Fellow cited small arms proliferation and mercenaries as problems contributing to security and instability in Africa. He said that there is no concerted action to control these situations. A U.S. Fellow observed that neither international nor state-based small arms bans have effective enforcement mechanisms.

INFORMATION SHARING

The moderator then asked the Fellows for their views on the current state of sharing of information among African governmental security agencies. An International Fellow recalled that two years ago the African Union began an information-sharing initiative with the establishment of the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA). He also noted that the Southern African Development Community (SADC) facilitates intelligence sharing among southern Africa's military and civilian intelligence chiefs. East Africa's Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has also developed intelligence-sharing mechanisms. One International Fellow confided that his country's regional security information sharing occurs when his country checks interna-


tional passports against a database that neighboring countries cooperate to maintain. Finally, another Fellow said that obstacles to effective intelligence sharing include a lack of resources and a lack of an “intelligence culture” in his country. Overall, the Fellows were in general agreement that it is the immediacy of any given threat in Africa that largely determines the extent of regional intelligence cooperation.



Ambassador Ranneberger discusses the U.S. State Department perspective on security issues in Africa with the Intelligence Fellows

General Charles F. “Chuck” Wald, USAF Deputy Commander, U.S. European Command

General Wald, via video teleconference from his U.S. European Command headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, addressed the International Fellows in Washington D.C. during both weeks of the program. The U.S. European Command is responsible for all U.S. forces operating across 91 countries in Europe, Africa, Russia, parts of Asia and the Middle East, and most of the Atlantic Ocean, as depicted below:



General Wald noted that the U.S. European Command’s objectives include supporting stability and good governance in Africa and that the Command is supporting the African Union through a variety of initiatives. He outlined both the European Command’s “vision” and strategic “pillars” for assisting and enhancing security and stability in Africa, as depicted on the next page.

General Wald described strategic challenges and opportunities in Africa from the perspective of the U.S. European Command. He posited four major challenges for African states: self-sufficiency, good governance, poverty reduction and health issues, and resolving inter-state conflicts.




Commander's Vision

"We seek a Europe that is a global partner for peace and security, an Africa that is self-sufficient and stable, and a broader Middle East at peace founded on a transformed, expeditionary USEUCOM advancing US interests forward that promotes regional security and stability, through enduring cooperation with a transforming and expanding NATO, the development of other capable regional security organizations, and effective security cooperation programs."

General James L. Jones




Our Strategic "Pillars" for Africa



The general noted that the U.S. has budgeted over \$300 million during the next five years to support the self-sufficiency of military forces in Africa and to improve the counterterrorism capabilities of African forces through the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI) program. He views the results of the U.S. sponsorship of the TSCTI as a success, and he foresees the Initiative continuing for several years. He cited the need for

long-term, positive relations between the United States and Africa as well as the requirement to develop pertinent, combined tactics, techniques, and procedures. General Wald views the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) as a model organization whose headquarters personnel provide good political leadership. He mentioned that the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Ghana is a prime example of what should and could be done to improve African peacekeeping capabilities. General Wald agreed that HIV/AIDS has become a strategic security issue and that the readiness of African peacekeeping personnel has become a priority. He also provided the Fellows with an overview of initiatives by the U.S. European Command to promote regional security in Africa through increasing the capability of African states to conduct peacekeeping and contingency operations, as well as assisting in developing Regional Response Forces, as outlined below:



Regional Security

- ☐ **Increase capability of nations to conduct peacekeeping and contingency operations in their regions**
 - ☐ **Counter terrorist activities by assisting African nations ...**
 - ☐ **Reduce pools of potential recruits**
 - ☐ **Destroy terrorist training and operating bases**
 - ☐ **Interdict transit routes**
 - ☐ **Assist development of Regional Response Forces**
 - ☐ **Focused training, bilateral exercises, leadership development**
 - ☐ **Individual equipment, regional and unit communications**

General Wald emphasized that the U.S. European Command's engagement efforts with African states is mainly on a regional basis and in tandem with U.S.-African bilateral relations. He remarked that the security of natural resources in Africa is being addressed. For example, he estimated that the United States could invest over \$100 billion in developing hydrocarbon resources in Africa's Gulf of Guinea region; thus the security of these resources will become increasingly important to both Africans and Americans. He noted that West African leaders are thinking more about maritime security issues. For example, he believes the Gulf of Guinea Commission would be a good forum for improving secu-



Strategic "Challenges" in Africa



Wars and serious conflicts since 1994



CONTINENT-WIDE CONCERNS

- PROPAGATION OF EXTREMISM
- INEFFECTIVE GOVERNANCE
- POVERTY
- CRIME
- HEALTH ISSUES
- INFRASTRUCTURE PROBLEMS
- POPULATION ~800M ... a challenge and opportunity



Strategic "Opportunities" for Africa



Europe

North America



CONTINENT-WIDE POTENTIAL

- + "NEW GENERATION" OF AFRICAN LEADERS
- + "PROMISING" REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
- + OTHER NATURAL RESOURCES
- + LABOR FORCE ~800M

rity. He emphasized that the United States does not desire to control the region and that the objective is to assist and advise the neighboring Gulf of Guinea countries in meeting their security needs.

Lastly, General Wald noted the importance of counterterrorism and bilateral and multinational information sharing among the United States and African countries. He acknowledged that progress in these efforts takes time to develop trust. After engaging in a protracted exchange with several of the International Fellows, he concluded the video teleconference by suggesting that the International Fellows Program is a positive step toward developing information sharing among allies. He reiterated that interpersonal relations are the key to progress in this arena, and urged the Fellows to keep in contact with each other and warn each other when there are threats.

Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, USN Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, USN, addressed the Fellows and provided an overview of issues and challenges facing U.S. Intelligence Community leaders. Admiral Jacoby emphasized that the DIA's mission objectives include integrating highly skilled intelligence professionals with leading-edge technology to discover information and create knowledge that supports U.S. warfighters, defense planners, and national security policymakers. To that end, he wants the Agency to have "knowledge workers," that is, thinkers, not just producers.

During his overview of the transforming U.S. Intelligence Community, Admiral Jacoby noted that the new Director of National Intelligence (DNI), Ambassador John D. Negroponte, provides guidance, policy, and approves the budgets for the 15 agencies that comprise the National Foreign Intelligence Community (NFIC), which includes Department of Defense intelligence organizations, as depicted below:



The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) coordinates the collection of national intelligence outside the United States through human sources by authorized elements of the Intelligence Community. The Department of Energy Office of Intelligence focuses on nuclear weapons and safety, and energy technology and security. Created in March 2003, the Department of Homeland Security brought together the organizations that were



responsible for protecting the border, customs, and immigration. The Department of Justice’s Federal Bureau of Investigation focuses on two main avenues within the NFIC: counterintelligence/counterespionage, and counterterrorism. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research focuses on the State Department’s global diplomatic mission and is its primary source for analysis on global economic issues. Admiral Jacoby described DIA’s functions and capabilities that respond to the requirements of both the DNI and the Secretary of Defense, as listed below.

Admiral Jacoby then described DIA’s workforce. He noted that civilians comprise 70 percent of DIA personnel and that the military make up the remaining 30 percent, as illustrated below.

The Admiral explained the reason why civilians constitute such a high percentage of the workforce — to have long-term analytical continuity. While military analysts bring valuable skills, insight, and recent combatant command and field perspectives to the DIA, they generally rotate out the Agency after three years. The Admiral mentioned that workforce planning is the ultimate denominator for success. DIA’s workforce planning includes developing “modern” attributes among its analysts. DIA seeks to teach and mentor analysts to become more culturally intuitive, diverse, and network-savvy through education and training organizations, as depicted below.



Defense Intelligence Agency

Combat Support Agency

- Provide Timely, Objective, Cogent Military Intelligence

DIA Supports:

- Military Operations
- Defense Policy Making
- Weapons Acquisition

Principal Capabilities

- Human and Technical Intelligence Collection
- Specialized All-Source Analysis
- Secure Information Networks
- Intelligence Training and Education



What We Bring


All-Source Analysis


- Produce All-Source Intelligence for the Warfighter, Policymaker and Acquisition Community
- Provide Current Intelligence Support to Chairman, Joint Staff
- Operates the National Military Joint Intelligence Center
- Manage Defense Intelligence Production across the community



National Military
Joint Intelligence Center







DISCUSSION

After these initial remarks, Admiral Jacoby opened the floor for questions. The Fellows asked the Admiral about the U.S. Intelligence Community's increasing emphasis on improving its human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities. Admiral Jacoby explained that the Department of Defense is raising HUMINT to a higher level of capabilities and performance, but not to the detriment of technical intelligence efforts, which are holding steady. He noted that during the period 1993-2000, while funding for HUMINT manpower was reduced, funding for technical intelligence had remained steady. Now, resources for HUMINT are increasing.

The discussion next led to a question posed to the Admiral by an International Fellow about media reports of friction in the Intelligence Community between the DIA and the CIA. Admiral Jacoby commented that the conflict attributed to CIA-DIA relations is not as contentious as the media depicts and that it is generally a resource issue. The Admiral noted that competition between the two agencies is far less now because of the high demand for intelligence that must be satisfied through cooperation among intelligence agencies. Admiral Jacoby noted that while the analytical culture in the two agencies may still differ, both agencies have strengths that complement each other. For example, the DIA features military analysis, while the CIA is more agile.

On the issue of U.S. interests in Africa, the Admiral noted that U.S. Government priorities for the continent have largely been derived from an intensification of interests over the last four years. Among the key areas of concern by the United States are resolving regional conflicts, promoting economic prosperity, and containing disease. The key is to work with the African Union because it is a major force on the continent and has tremendous potential. Admiral Jacoby concluded that the current situation presents a unique opportunity for the U.S. to work in close coordination with the European Union, the United Nations, and African states.




Admiral Jacoby engaged in a discussion with the International Fellows about the U.S. Intelligence Community

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Africa Bureau
Office of the Secretary of Defense

The program featured extensive interaction between the International Fellows and senior officials at the national policy level. Thus, an entire day of the curriculum was devoted to exploring Department of Defense views toward Africa security issues. The first speaker was Ms. Theresa Whelan, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Africa Bureau, Office of the Secretary of Defense. She shared insights about U.S. defense and security interests in Africa from her perspective as a leading policymaker on Africa issues within the Department of Defense.

Ms. Whelan began the presentation by describing her office's wide-ranging responsibilities for coordinating U.S. security policies toward Africa. She noted that her office interacts with other officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the State Department, and the U.S. combatant commands. Ms. Whelan briefly explained the dynamics of the three U.S. combatant commands with responsibilities for U.S. military activities involving Africa. She noted that the U.S. European Command (EUCOM), U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), and U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) all share responsibilities for security cooperation and engagement with African countries, as depicted below:



Ms. Whelan then described issues of mutual interest to the United States and African countries, in economic, political, health, and national defense fields. She emphasized several themes of the Bush Administration's policy toward Africa, which include taking a strategic approach by supporting regional organizations such as the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States. This approach also includes prioritizing U.S. goals and objectives in Africa such as combating HIV/AIDS and focusing U.S. cooperation on success—in those countries making progress. Other themes include assisting in developing Africa's economy, democratic institutions, medical care, resolving conflicts, and conserving and protecting Africa's natural resources.

Next, Ms. Whelan noted that Department of Defense policy toward Africa is derived from guidance from the Bush Administration and the Department of State. Thus, Department of Defense priorities in Africa include the Global War on Terrorism, strong military-to-military relations, military progress and reform, building sustainable capacity in government institutions, working with European allies, and promoting good governance. The Department of Defense security strategy for Africa includes promoting civilian control over military institutions, developing professional military organizations, and building national and regional capacity. This strategy includes enhancing military professionalism through increased training and building skilled, appropriately equipped, and well-led African militaries. Key strategic goals include improving counterterrorism capabilities and national and regional capacities to participate in peacekeeping operations, reforming African defense organizations, ensuring military adherence to democratic principles, promoting military leadership awareness of HIV/AIDS, and increasing cooperation with European partners in Africa.

After her initial remarks, Ms. Whelan opened the floor to questions. One International Fellow commented that the U.S. Government's division of the African continent between sub-Saharan Africa (south) and North Africa (north) is "sometimes offensive to Africans." Ms. Whelan responded that, in her view, this division was more a fact of the past and not the present. She opined that this division occurred because of lingering bureaucratic reasons. Historically, the U.S. Government has accustomed itself politically to an alignment between North Africa and the Mediterranean regions rather than linking either of them closely with sub-Saharan Africa.

An International Fellow asked whether the United States would emphasize equipment at the expense of training when considering types and composition of security assistance and cooperation with Africa. Ms. Whelan responded that equipment and training go together and that the United States is addressing equipment issues and expanding training programs. She emphasized that equipment should be procured based on particular environments. For example, equipment should be made available that can be easily repaired and have parts replaced. She also noted that existing equipment and training programs have been successful, albeit small in scale. Ms. Whelan commented that further progress is expected by enhancing follow-on U.S.-funded security training programs with Africa states such as the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative.

Next, Ms. Whelan was asked to list what she thought were the top five security concerns in sub-Saharan Africa. In response, she cited the following:

- The problem with ungoverned areas that can be used by extremists;
- The general instability in African countries and the ability of small groups to destabilize whole countries;
- HIV/ AIDS as a security issue due to the potential demographic impacts as well as the negative impact on the health and readiness of African militaries;
- Maritime security, previously not a major focus, but which impacts economic development;
- The effect of corruption on stability.



Ms. Whelan concluded by emphasizing that the United States is also trying to enhance security in Africa by increasing cooperation in areas such as intelligence and communication. She noted that the key to effective counterterrorism is being able to take raw details into account, be predictive, and position forces to capture or kill terrorists. Lastly, she highlighted that the U.S. security strategy devoted to Africa has different programs that are tailored to the different needs of different countries.

PERSPECTIVES FROM THE REGION

AFRICAN SECURITY CONCERNS

Another aspect of the program involved interaction between the International Fellows and officials at the Theater Combatant Command level. Thus, an entire day of the curriculum was devoted to exploring the views of the International Fellows and representatives from the U.S. Central Command, and the U.S. European Command. The first event of the day involved a small-group exercise in which the Fellows were organized into three groups working on the task of identifying and ranking their top five security concerns for Africa. The results from the groups emphasized issues in governance, natural resources, conflict, terrorism, and health.

UNCLASSIFIED

 <h3><i>African Security Concerns</i></h3> 			
RATING <small>* From 1 = most important to 5 = less important</small>	GROUP 1	GROUP 2	GROUP 3
1	Poor Governance/ Secure & Stable environment	Poverty	Natural Resources
2	Conflicts	Ethno/Religious Conflicts	Effective Governance
3	Arms Proliferation (mercenaries, piracy issues, etc.)	Health Issues	Intra-state conflicts
4	Health	Terrorism	Health
5	Terrorism	Resources	Terrorism

JMIC IIFP 2005

Following presentations by each of the three groups to an executive panel, the Fellows engaged in discussion with the panel members about the results. One panel member asked the Fellows whether they had observed the interlinking of various factors, and also what have been some difficulties in addressing the security problems that they had identified. In response one International Fellow observed that good governance was chosen by all three groups because countries like his own have witnessed “its better effects.” Another Fellow pointed out that, in his view, countries with natural resource problems give first priority to

these issues. Another stated that a measure of good governance and its effects on stability depends on how resources are allocated. Most Fellows agreed that persistent poverty was an underlying, contributing cause to conflict and instability. Another Fellow commented that the lack of economic opportunities in many regions affected by conflict highlighted the need for the effective re-integration of former combatants into society. If these combatants cannot find legitimate employment, many turn to illegal activities such as money laundering, poaching, smuggling, and trafficking in narcotics and small arms. The Fellows viewed conflicts in Africa as regional threats to stability because of their spreading across borders into neighboring countries. Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo are areas of major concern in this regard.



Major General Adu-Amanfoh (Ghana) makes a point during a group discussion, while Lt Col Diarra (Mali), Mr. Rhett Scott (U.S. CENTCOM), and Col Randrianarivelo (Madagascar) observe

One International Fellow emphasized that he viewed illegal immigration within Africa as a growing security problem for the continent. He noted that in the capital of his country there are large suburbs where the demographics are changing rapidly. For example, large population groups have recently settled illegally and speak non-native languages and worship non-native religions. This is a problem because many among the new wave of illegal immigrants have no roots in no commitment to the country. A majority of Fellows mentioned improved border security as essential to stemming the flow of illegal immigrants

and preventing terrorists and criminals from free movement. Another International Fellow turned the topic to maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea and cited difficulties with illegal fishing and toxic waste dumping by foreigners in territorial waters. He also mentioned that his country's leaders were determining how to proceed in supporting regional resource security measures using surveillance and law enforcement assets.



Group Captain Dangana (Nigeria), Colonel Dikobe (Botswana), Colonel Shepherd (U.S. JTF HOA), Lieutenant Colonel Mugira (Uganda), and Lieutenant Colonel Kigotho (Kenya) were among the Fellows discussing security issues in Africa



General Mackenzie (Angola) and Colonel Ocran (Ghana)



Commander Parker (U.S. EUCOM), Colonel Ocran (Ghana), Colonel Hamidou (Niger) listen to points made by Mr. Henri-Leopold (Cameroon)

U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND PERSPECTIVE

Mr. Daniel T. Morris

Associate Director of Intelligence, U.S. Central Command

Mr. Morris, Associate Director of Intelligence, U.S. Central Command, addressed the Fellows by video teleconference from his office headquarters in Tampa, Florida. He depicted the Command's area of responsibility as a diverse region featuring 27 countries, 65 million people, seven languages, and 65 percent of known oil reserves. Among the issues important to security and stability in the region are contested ethnic and political boundaries, water resources, and terrorism. Mr. Morris emphasized that the primary enemy is Al-Qaida ideology and associated movements. He also noted that the Global War on Terrorism will be a long war and that human intelligence from allies who have joined the fight is vital. He noted that the immediate and continuing task for the U.S. Central Command is to stabilize Iraq and Afghanistan.

Mr. Morris's command briefing was illustrated with the images reproduced here:



CENTCOM AOR

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DIVERSE...RICH HERITAGE...CHALLENGED

- 27 Countries
- 651 Million People
- 7 Major Languages
- 12+ Major Religious Groups
- 18+ Major Ethnic Groups
- 3 x Strategic Chokepoints



- Per Capita Income:
Qatar: >\$30,000
Afghanistan & Somalia: <\$200
- 65% of Known Oil Reserves
- 43% of World's Petroleum Products Transit the Strait of Hormuz

UNCLASSIFIED

Ethnic vs Political Boundaries

- Baggara Arab
- Beja
- Dinka
- Nuba
- Mixed Tribes
- Afar
- Tigray
- Amhara
- Oromo
- Issa
- Bantu
- Nilotic
- Hawiya
- Rahanwein
- Digil
- Darod




- Arab
- Kurd
- Persian
- Azeri
- Baluchi
- Sindhi
- Punjabi
- Pushtun
- Hazara
- Tajik
- Turkmen
- Uzbek
- Aimak
- Kirghiz
- Kazakh
- Russian

NOTE: Sparsely populated areas are shown in tan



Water-Basis for Concern?



JORDAN
NILE
SYR DARYA
AMU DARYA
TIGRIS & EUPHRATES
INDUS



Back

Economic Health

Human Development Index (HDI)

- Highest
- Hi-Middle
- Low-Middle
- Lowest



Highest

Bahrain
Qatar
Kuwait
UAE

Lowest

HOA
Yemen
Afghanistan
Pakistan

Per Capita Income:


- Qatar: ~\$30,250
- Afghanistan & Somalia: ~\$200

Back

Petroleum Fueling the World

Middle East	65%
W. Hem & W. Europe	13%
Africa	9%
E. Europe & FSU	8%
Asia Pacific	5%

Percentage of Oil Imported
from Middle East



- Reflects conventional proven oil reserves
- Total world reserves estimated at just over 1 trillion barrels

- Arabian Gulf critical to world oil supply
- Gulf countries currently produce ~28% of world's oil
- Regional stability and access to oil essential to global economy

Back

Somalia

Somaliland

- Stable, peaceful, democratic transitions of power

Disputed area

- Sool and Sanaag regions disputed by Somaliland and Puntland

Puntland & Southern Somalia

- Unstable, warring clans vie for power

Transitional Federal Government

- TFG composition achieved via clan power-sharing formula
- Clan opposition to foreign troops hinders TFG move to Somalia
- Somaliland rejects TFG; remains committed to own independence




U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND PERSPECTIVE

Commander Ron Parker, USN U.S. European Command

Commander Parker, a U.S. Fellow representing the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) during the program, provided an overview of EUCOM J-2 security and intelligence issues and J-5 EUCOM theater engagement initiatives. Commander Parker noted a number of recent counterterrorism successes on the African continent, and the prospects for ongoing regional crises. He described challenges posed by “under-governed” regions and by North African extremist groups with the potential to threaten Africa’s security. Such groups include Al Para, the Moroccan Islamic Combat Group (GICM), Salafiya Jihadiya (SJ), and the Libya Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG).

Commander Parker also outlined EUCOM J-5’s security assistance and engagement strategy for Africa which includes support for the developing African Union Standby Force (ASF), African Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA), and the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI). The overall objective of the ACOTA and GPOI programs is to build regional mobility for African Peacekeeping Operations forces. The ACOTA and GPOI programs focus on training in infantry skills, human rights protection, humanitarian operations, and rules of engagement that are consistent with the United Nations Chapter 7 mandate for peacekeeping. Commander Parker discussed several other EUCOM-supported initiatives aimed at improving Africa’s regional logistics, to include mobility, air and maritime security, communications and information exchange, and medical capabilities.

An outline of the European Command briefing appears on the next pages:




Africa's Strategic "Challenges"

Continent-wide concerns:

- ☐ Historical conflict
- ☐ Propagation of extremism
- ☐ Ineffective governance
- ☐ Migration and "brain drain"
- ☐ Poverty
- ☐ Crime
- ☐ Health issues
- ☐ Infrastructure problems
- ☐ Population of ~800M
- ☐ ... a challenge and opportunity



Wars and serious conflicts since 1994



African Outlook

Gulf of Guinea

Nigeria:

- ☐ Niger delta violence
- ☐ Rise in religious extremism
- ☐ Oil Bunkering

The Darfur Region

Sudan/Chad:

- ☐ Janjaweed attacks on civilians forcing mass migration
- ☐ Over one million displaced by violence

West Africa

Sierra Leone:

- ☐ Slow progress in reform

Liberia:

- ☐ Violence continues

Cote d'Ivoire:

- ☐ Country Split along North/South border

Togo:

- ☐ Internal strife after election

Great Lakes Region

Uganda:

- ☐ LRA activity continues

Rwanda:

- ☐ Underlying ethnic tensions

Burundi:

- ☐ Sporadic violence persist as efforts to move the peace process forward continue

DRC:

- ☐ Instability in the east threatening Great Lakes region

Southern Africa

Angola:


- ☐ Progress in neighbor relations

South Africa:

- ☐ Trade and investment increase; enormous health concerns remain

External Influences

- ☐ Religious extremism



Maritime Threats

- 3rd highest of world piracy incidents; most dangerous area in Africa for maritime crime
- Niger Delta threats are more organized, violent; swarm tactics and open fire on commercial ships
 - Nigerian Navy capabilities improving
 - Police suffer from frequent casualties

ICC International Maritime Bureau (IMB) Piracy and Armed Robbery - 1 Jan to 31 Dec 2004 Attacks in Africa

Map of Africa showing incidents concentrated around the Gulf of Guinea and West Africa. A small inset photo shows a person holding a rifle.

Produced by the Geographic Research Ltd. University of Addis


Incidents of piracy concentrated around the Gulf of Guinea and West Africa



NORTH AFRICAN EXTREMISM

The Changing Threat Environment

- Old Environment (Pre - Sep 2001)
 - Al-Qaida as a corporate, top - down model
 - Membership comprised of international cadre who fled from crackdowns in their homelands
 - Afghanistan safe haven
 - Overt recruiting and training
- New Thinking (Post - Afghanistan)
 - Decentralized structures and execution
 - Dispersed network that co-opts local support networks
 - No clear sanctuaries
 - "Franchise" operations



North African networks are operating as franchises based on shared ideology and "commander's intent"



NORTH AFRICAN EXTREMISM

Transnational Interest in North African Extremists

- Global jihad movement now sustained on "franchised" operations
 - North African extremists key to this trend
- Faltering campaigns in North Africa shift extremists focus to transnational objectives
- Al-Qaida / transnational interest in leveraging local extremists continues
 - Casablanca bombings in May 2003
 - Madrid bombings in March 2004
 - Evidence of AQ interest in Nigeria



Casablanca Suicide Bombings, May 03



Madrid Train Bombings, March 04



Concerns for the Future

- **Al Zawahiri's two-pronged offensive:**
 - **Networks in western countries:**
 - Laying low
 - Planning large strikes
 - Cause maximum casualties
 - Political impact
 - Encouraged to attack targets as they arise
 - Aim to destabilize local regimes
 - **Messages from al-Qaeda leaders:**
 - "Near enemy" - Western-allied governments
 - "Far enemy" - Infidel powers of US and UK



Ayman al Zawahiri



Oil Facility



NORTH AFRICAN EXTREMISM Conclusion

- **Continuing pattern - al-Qaida assessing local groups for franchising possibilities**
 - Leveraging local support network and individuals for further recruitment and training
 - Dispatched operatives lay groundwork for future operations
- **The undergoverned areas of North Africa and the Sahel remain of high interest to transnational extremists**
 - Sahel attractive for recruiting and as a safe haven
- **European Sanctuary allow extremists to exploit legal protections**
 - Extremists utilize region for logistical and fund -raising possibilities
 - Also leverage generous asylum and welfare benefit systems
- **Growing importance of franchise groups**
 - Ongoing interrelationships between regional groups continue
 - Varying levels of cooperation, ever changing dynamics



Trans-Regional Initiatives

- Improving operational capability
 - African Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA)
 - Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI)
 - Information sharing
 - Regional mobility
 - Air traffic control
 - Regional C4 architecture
 - English language training



ECOMIL in Liberia 2002

Focus is “train the trainer”



ACOTA

- Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance
 - Initiated in 1997 to enhance existing African PKO capabilities
 - Focus on infantry skill, human rights, humanitarian operations and rules of engagement consistent with Chapter 7 of UN charter
 - ACOTA currently training three to four battalions a year in Africa
 - Current partners: Benin, Botswana, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Senegal, South Africa




GPOI

- ☐ **Global Peace Operations Initiative**
 - ☐ **Global initiative to build world 's peacekeeping capabilities**
 - ☐ **Africa is primary focus —would triple current ACOTA capacity**
 - ☐ **Train planners, support deployments and exercises, provide selected equipment to support PKO capabilities**
 - ☐ **Additional support to military staff capabilities at African Union and regional organizations**



Africa Union Sub-Regions (proposed)






African Union Standby Force

- Overall objective: Develop means within Africa to support a common African defense and security policy
- Required capabilities:
 - Plan, execute, and manage peacekeeping missions
 - Conduct humanitarian assistance operations
 - Achieve rapid reaction and deployment to crises
- The way ahead:
 - Develop, coordinate, and execute a strategies in each region for brigade -sized response forces
 - Establish regional headquarters for these units



African Union Standby Force






Regional Mobility

- **Help Africa develop a long -range plan to improve its indigenous mobility by region**
 - **Work with the AU to develop regional mobility hubs**
 - **Possible pooled aircraft and pilot resources**
 - **Regional maintenance facilities and logistics pipelines**
 - **Cooperative upgrades or “compatible” new equipment purchases**
 - **Work with participating nations to improve the operational capability of their airlift fleets**
- **Help establish an organization to schedule, coordinate, execute, and bill regional airlift missions in support of African Union - approved operations**



Air Security

- **Assist African development of modern air traffic control system to strengthen air surveillance and air security throughout the continent to decrease ungoverned space**
- **Integrate civil and military systems and standardize procedures to maximize surveillance coverage and increase effectiveness**
 - **Engage with international civil air authorities and commercial airline companies for partnered investment for airport security**





Maritime Security

- Enhance security of national ports and littoral areas
 - Improve Navy and Coast Guard capabilities to patrol coastal waters, detect illegal activities, and conduct hull inspections
- Promote collective and cooperative maritime security beyond the littorals
 - Protect natural resources (e.g., fish and wildlife, minerals, and hydrocarbons)
 - Improve maritime command and control



Regional C⁴ Initiative

- Help African Union and the regional headquarters establish connectivity between...
 - African Union headquarters and each regional headquarters
 - Regional headquarters and each member nation's military HQ
- Assist installation of baseline architecture for both unclassified and secure communications
 - Consider a CENTRIXS-like system for moving messages and operational data (e.g., air tasking orders, logistics plans)
- Develop plan to upgrade C⁴ system to meet changing requirements
 - "Coalition Chat" software (French, Portuguese, English)



Trans-Regional Initiatives

- **Working tomorrow's problems today**
 - Africa clearinghouse
 - African website
 - Medical assistance
 - Education
 - Leadership
 - Professional
 - Civil-military relationships
 - Technical
 - Ethical
- **Protecting resources**



A new AIDS clinic...and new hope



Africa Clearing House

- **Objective:** provide forum for exchange of information and to coordinate activities and programs on the African continent
- **Participants:** Over 40 personnel
 - Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, UK, US, and EU
- Meetings held semi-annually
- EUCOM hosted the most recent Africa Clearinghouse (Nov)
 - Different regional focus each ACH
- Open to all interested nations with engagement programs in Africa
- Next meeting set for July – UK / G8 host



Medical Initiatives

- Leverage humanitarian assistance programs to combat disease, relieve human suffering, and improve the lives of Africans—DoD's activities include:
 - HIV/AIDS Program (\$26.1M in FY04)
 - Malaria Prevention Program
 - Humanitarian Mine Action Program
 - Medical facility, clinic, orphanage, and school construction
- Use excess property to supply clinics, hospitals, and schools with needed equipment and supplies
- Synchronize medical and dental outreach to support HA objectives
- Use and integrate other US government programs (PEPFAR) and those managed by allied partners and the UN



Colonel Ocran (Ghana) poses a question to Commander Parker about the U.S. European Command's vision for intelligence and security cooperation with Africa

TRANSNATIONAL SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE ISSUES

STRATEGIC SECURITY ISSUES IN AFRICA

Ambassador David Shinn
Adjunct Professor
The Elliot School of International Affairs
The George Washington University

Ambassador Shinn discussed strategic existing security issues and emerging problems in Africa. He addressed the following topics:

- **Small arms proliferation.** Proliferation of small arms is a problem particularly in Somalia. Even if not a direct threat to peace in a particular country, small arms are often a problem for neighboring countries.
- **Government corruption.** The degree of corruption among government institutions is particularly bad in African states.
- **Human rights abuses.** While Botswana and South Africa have good records, threats to security in other African states often result in attendant abuse by security forces.
- **HIV/AIDS** is a threat to African state security forces because it degrades their capabilities. Security forces often have higher rates of HIV/AIDS infection than the civilian population.
- **Poverty.** Overwhelming poverty in African states is a security threat. Poverty leads to instability, requires huge infusions of outside funds and brings inauspicious changes to domestic government.
- **Water Resources.** Nile River basin water issues. The 1959 Treaty, which ceded two-thirds of Nile River water to Egypt and one-third to Sudan, does not take into account certain realities. Water for 86 percent of the main tributary of the Nile River, the Blue Nile, originates in Ethiopia, whereas another major tributary, the White Nile, largely evaporates in Sudan. Thus, there remains a potential for a water resource allocation dispute among states in the region.
- **Hydrocarbon Security.** Protection of oil pipelines, resources, and other assets in onshore and offshore areas in many states ranging from Nigeria and Angola to the Red Sea is insufficient.
- **Economic strength.** Of major concern is maintaining the strength of the South African economy, which in turn impacts the multinational Southern African Development Community. South Africa's official unemployment rate stands at 31 percent, but is probably higher. Fifty percent of South Africans are below the poverty line, and two-thirds of personal income is concentrated among 20 percent of the population.

- **Ethnic conflict.** Somalia has six major clans that have not yet formed a central government, and this remains one of the most intractable problems in East Africa. Religious divisions in the Darfur region of Sudan constitute a problem for which no quick end can be foreseen. Ambassador Shinn went on to describe other African states with ethnic conflict, to include: Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Burundi, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, Western Sahara, and Ethiopia and Eritrea.
- **Radical Islam.** Variants of radical Islam are making inroads in some African regions, to include the Sahel and Eastern Africa.

DISCUSSION

An International Fellow concurred with Ambassador Shinn that there is a continuing problem with poverty in Africa, noting that after World War II, the United States created and funded the Marshall Plan to develop a devastated Europe. The Fellow then asked what is hindering the United States from helping with African recovery efforts in the form of a "Marshall Plan for Africa?" Ambassador Shinn replied that, in his view, he did not see the United States taking on that problem because of U.S. budget concerns, particularly since the United States is fighting a three-front, very expensive Global War on Terrorism. The ambassador explained that although the United States has dispensed over \$15 billion in foreign assistance globally during the past five years, questions remain over whether such assistance has gone into the "wrong pockets." He added that foreign aid is often not used well by recipient states. However, he noted the potential for improvement with appropriate programs such as the Millennium Challenge Account, a foreign aid program set to reach \$5 billion annually, providing aid benefits to governments that are assessed as "best performers."

A few International Fellows commented on the phenomenon of extremist Islam making inroads in the Sahel. One Fellow stressed that the conflict pits followers of Wahhabism against followers of Sufism. Another Fellow added that Wahhabism is a distorted and intolerant form of radical Islam. Wahhabism was established in the 18th Century and during the past 30 years has been exported from Saudi Arabia to other countries. The followers of Wahhabism reject "Sufi brotherhood" and have contributed to religious conflict in Africa; Wahhabis have damaged over 100 Sufi mosques and scores of tombs in Africa. Another Fellow added that religious conflicts exist between Muslims and Christians in other parts of Africa.

Another Fellow questioned whether religious differences were a major cause of conflicts in Africa. He added that the underlying reasons for conflicts are the result of poverty and poor economic opportunities, and that Africa is not benefiting from globalization. Other observers concurred that religious and economic competition run in parallel. Several Fellows suggested that swelling urban populations, illegal migration and refugees, natural resource scarcities, and infectious diseases also contribute to conflict.

Turning to the issue of good governance, an International Fellow commented that new forms of representative government are taking hold more readily in African than in Mid-

dle Eastern states. The Fellow added that a positive correlation exists between a more democratic state and better economic development. Another Fellow added that corruption and transparency are still problems among African government institutions. He added that “African [entrepreneurs] don’t own [and cannot apply good management techniques to] natural resources” because governments control resource development and associated revenues.

Several International Fellows engaged in discussion of security of energy resources. While Ambassador Shinn mentioned that oil pipeline protection was a key security issue in states such as Nigeria and Chad, one International Fellow commented that his country’s offshore oil and gas operations have been plagued by repeated occupation of oil platforms, assaults against oil-carrying ships, piracy, and kidnappings. Another International Fellow mentioned that his country’s offshore oil platforms have been raided and stripped of parts. He added that security forces are insufficient to prevent these losses. Another International Fellow commented that oil from on-shore pipelines is continually siphoned by looters and that oil from off-shore pipelines is stolen by “bunkering” techniques involving criminals using small barges and sea-going tankers to siphon off, then sell, the pilfered oil.



Ambassador Shinn is thanked by Mr. Larry Hiponia, Program Director, following the Ambassador’s remarks to the International Fellows

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ISSUES IN AFRICA

Mr. Eli Sasaran, Senior Analyst Defense Intelligence Agency

Mr. Eli Sasaran, a senior analyst at the Defense Intelligence Agency, provided an overview of strategic intelligence issues in Africa from the U.S. perspective. He emphasized that Africa's political, economic, and social progress requires a secure and stable environment, with resolution of the continent's conflicts being the key enabler to success. Mr. Sasaran highlighted several security issues impacting stability in Africa, focusing on "drivers" that contribute to instability, as well as regional and transnational security concerns. The eight drivers that Mr. Sasaran identified represent key strategic intelligence and security focus areas for intelligence analysts, and include:

- Ethnic and tribal differences
- Religious differences
- Natural resource scarcities and disparities
- Access to communications and information
- "Youth Bulge" population demographics
- Urbanization
- Hard-to-Govern areas
- Cross-border spillover from multiple, on-going conflicts

Ethnic and tribal tensions. Mr. Sasaran noted that ethnic and tribal tensions are exacerbated by inequalities in access to power and wealth. Actual or perceived favoritism on the part of governments fosters resentment among various ethnic and tribal groups, which leads to tensions within institutions and societies. As a result, rival factions emerge which maneuver and probe each other to exploit weaknesses in governing institutions, often resulting in civil unrest, insurgencies, and coups.

Religion. Religious differences, particularly between Christian and Muslim extremist groups, have led to outbreaks of communal and religious violence. Proselytizing by groups from Saudi Arabia and Iran have contributed to religious tensions. Some African governments face difficult choices over whether to allow exclusionary or more tolerant religious policies to prevail in their societies.

Natural resources. Natural resource scarcities and disparities contribute to conflict within and between some African countries. Conflicts involving natural resources reinforce ethnic and religious strife, encourage crime and corruption, and discourage foreign trade and investment. Many African states also experience frequent environmental stresses on resources due to drought, desertification, deforestation, soil erosion, overgrazing and over-fishing.

Communications. Many Africans are aware of economic, social, and political conditions elsewhere on the continent because of their unprecedented access to communications and information. Access to information fuels higher political and economic expectations for development and progress in their societies. These expectations place greater demands on African leaders to address economic and political tensions and grievances. Increased international communication and publicity about conditions in Africa also place greater demands on foreign powers to intervene to help end or stabilize conflicts and provide humanitarian aid.

“Youth Bulge.” A disproportionate concentration of Africa’s population in the 15 to 29 age range has led to the demographers’ “youth bulge.” While the populations of youth in many developing countries will remain large, the size of the youth bulge will decrease in all regions of the world except for Sub-Saharan Africa. Strategic intelligence analysts are concerned that over the next 20 years, consequences from the youth bulge in Africa will lead to greater instability and security challenges for African governments. Challenges for African governments include providing large numbers of young people with education, employment, and housing opportunities. Failure to accommodate these needs will lead to uneducated, unemployed, unsettled and unhappy youth.

Urbanization. By 2015, for the first time in human history, the majority of all the world’s people will reside in urban areas. This global trend exacerbates problems stemming from disgruntled youth in urban areas. Cities can be microcosms of a country’s divisions and conflicts, with communal and religious violence spilling over into the streets. Dissatisfied youth are easily manipulated by religious and political ideologues with their own agendas. Social upheaval could be triggered by anger over quality of life issues such as: energy and water shortages, inadequate social services, rising unemployment, crime and corruption, and environmental or health disasters. Urban conflict is hard to control due to the density of population and the inability to quickly alleviate conditions that spark unrest.

Hard-to-govern areas. Vast tracts of unpopulated land lacking military, security, or law enforcement coverage can be ideal safe havens for rebels, outlaws, and terrorists. Criminal and terrorist groups use these areas as bases for launching operations, recruiting, and smuggling. These areas are also vulnerable to foreign elements that provide support to dissidents and terrorists.

Cross-border spillover from conflicts. Instability in Africa often results from multiple instances of a crisis in one country spilling over beyond its borders into neighboring states. For example, the 1994 Rwanda crisis set in motion a chain of events first destabilizing the Great Lakes Region, next spreading to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, then directly or indirectly involving many neighboring states, resulting in the widest interstate war ever on the African continent. Lingering conflicts in Africa have resulted in creating Africa’s “lost generation,” of mostly male combatants who have been at war for most of their lives. Many of these fighters are now mercenaries who are motivated by money and plunder.

However, African governments have shown a willingness to respond to the challenge of conflict by creating regional organizations to address security concerns. African governments are taking on greater responsibility by setting security agendas, creating regional security organizations to conduct peacekeeping in areas of conflict, offering venues for peace talks, and encouraging compromise and cease-fire arrangements among combatants. The emergence of the African Union and regional organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States, Southern African Development Cooperation, Economic Community of Central African States, and the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development have led to proactive measures in conflict mediation, economic development, and post-war stabilization efforts.

TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES



Next, Mr. Sasaran addressed arms proliferation, terrorism, and energy security, which he sees as the top three transnational issues impacting security in Africa.

Arms proliferation. Africa has a long history of small arms fueling internal and regional wars. Further build-ups of small arms will destabilize some African states and regions. Arms proliferation in Africa is growing from two types of methods: regulated state-to-state arms transfers and unregulated “black” or “grey” arms markets. The most popular state-to-state arms sales for African militaries include upgraded heavy weapons such as main battle tanks, multiple rocket launchers, self-propelled artillery, and third- and fourth-generation fighter aircraft. Individual and crew-served arms proliferation will




Transnational Issues: Arms Proliferation

Directorate for Analysis

- **Plethora of small arms fuels internal wars**

- **Build-up of large arms could have destabilizing effect**


continue to be the most persistent and major problem impacting security and stability in Africa.



Terrorism. Like the United States, Africa has experienced carnage from acts of terrorism, most notably on 7 August 1998 when the U.S. embassy bombings in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi resulted in 240 killed and over 5,000 injured. Terrorism has resulted not only in death and injury, but also in decreased tourism revenue and foreign investment. African leaders are well aware of the importance of addressing terrorism as a threat to African security and global peace. It is unlikely that a Taliban-type regime would emerge in Africa, but pockets of religious extremists who advocate violence already exist. Religious extremists could provide support and sanctuary for terrorists in un-governed spaces. Proselytizing efforts and recruitment by violent religious extremists, particularly among Africa’s embittered youth, can be reinforced by external financing and support. East Africa is especially vulnerable due to its proximity to terror networks emerging out of the Middle East. Historical, cultural, religious, political, and commercial links and ties between East Africa and the Middle East facilitate continuous transfer and movement of goods and people, possibly including terrorists and their weapons.



Transnational Issues: Terrorism


Directorate for Analysis

- East Africa especially vulnerable
- Proximity to terror networks emerging out of Middle East
- Africa has already experienced carnage from acts of terrorism



Energy Security. Threats to African energy interests from terrorists and others include killing and kidnapping of people, as well as destruction of facilities to disrupt and divert production. These violent acts also make a political statement; namely, demanding a greater share of power and control of oil revenues. Africa is becoming an increasingly



important source of oil to the world. Many Western and other international petroleum companies are heavily invested in African oil extraction and production facilities. Africa currently provides the United States with 15 percent of its imported oil. Foreign dependence on African oil increases the stakes for all in promoting a stable security environment in Africa.



Transnational Issues: African Energy Security

Directorate for Analysis

- **Africa becoming an increasingly important source of oil to world**
- **Increases stake for all in promoting a stable environment**
- **Threats to energy interests by terrorists and others:**
 - **To kill or kidnap personnel, destroy facilities, disrupt / divert production**
 - **To make a political statement for greater share of power and oil revenues**




OUTLOOK

Mr. Sasaran expects that conflicts will persist in Africa. However, the prospects for resolving some conflicts will be better because of the recent successes by African leaders at mediating conflicts, negotiating peace agreements, dispatching peacekeepers, and monitoring cease-fire arrangements. Recent African diplomatic and military responses have eased tensions and lessened the severity of many conflicts. African peacekeeping skills, capabilities, and experiences are improving. The biggest challenge will be getting adequate resources to support peacekeeping missions. Resolution of African conflicts will require sustained commitment on the part of African states and the international community to promote political and economic reforms and support peacekeeping operations in African conflict zones.

Mr. Sasaran observed that conflicts will persist in Africa because incentives for warfare are likely to increase. There is greater potential for dissident elements to emerge in African society because of increasing urbanization and youth populations, rising economic expectations and pressures, and income disparities that could lead to greater demands for

the sharing of power and wealth. Conflicts over scarce natural resources, not just high-value commodities such as oil and diamonds, are also likely to increase. Likewise, there are growing tensions over water, fisheries, and arable land which have been reinforced by environmental stresses. Overall, Mr. Sasaran presented a mixed picture of both positive and negative factors that will continue to influence the security of Africa. He urged intelligence analysts to focus their efforts on the key “drivers”— factors and conditions leading to conflicts in Africa, as listed below:





Outlook: Mixed picture; both positive and negative factors

Directorate for Analysis




❑ Many drivers point to continuing and perhaps worsening conflicts

- ❑ Ethnic / religious differences
- ❑ Resource scarcities / disparities
- ❑ Environmental stresses
- ❑ Rising expectations
- ❑ Alienated, unemployed youth
- ❑ Urbanization and its multiple problems
- ❑ Pockets of religious extremism
- ❑ Cross-border spillover of conflicts
- ❑ Arms proliferation
- ❑ Terrorism

DISCUSSION

An International Fellow commented that the United States seems to “paint a gloomy picture of Africa.” He also added that the strategic intelligence interest in Africa should focus on the roots of conflict. A U.S. Fellow concurred, saying that he looked for reasons underlying various conflicts and that there is an interagency effort to find solutions. Another U.S. Fellow interjected that the apparently negative picture is due to the nature of intelligence work that by necessity must anticipate and describe the worst that can happen.

Another International Fellow said that HIV/AIDS is affecting much of African youth. A U.S. Fellow cited World Health Organization studies that show that HIV prevalence is higher among African society’s youth compared to the youth populations of other developing countries. Religious influences, rather than ethnic influences, appear to account for

some differences in infection rates in some regions, as devout Christians and Muslims have fared better than their animist neighbors.

Other Fellows commented that the West's emphasis on applying strict human rights and justice mechanisms to African conflicts often result in what Africans view as negative criticism of African efforts to promote stability in volatile regions. For example, one International Fellow stated that in order to pursue peace in Liberia, it was necessary in the view of African leaders to arrange for Charles Taylor's exile to Nigeria, giving him immunity from prosecution for the sake of national and regional stability. However, subsequently, Nigeria has been under international pressure to release him to the International Criminal Court for war crimes. A U.S. Fellow commented that, from the U.S. point of view, the establishment of social stability was indeed seen as a more critical need than the achievement of immediate justice, despite the apparent international pressure on Nigeria.



The International Fellows engaged in discussion following Mr. Sasaran's briefing on strategic intelligence issues in Africa

Rounding out the discussion, one International Fellow was interested in whether a quick response could be expected from the United States in case of an emergency, like another Rwandan genocide. In response, a U.S. Fellow referred to a remark by Ambassador Johnnie Carson about the need for an African lobby based in Washington, D.C. to garner support from U.S. political decisionmakers. In the Sudan conflict, for example, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army's (SPLM/A) efforts in lobbying U.S. Government officials had gained critical visibility and support in the United States and Europe in support of attaining a viable peace settlement.

GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM PANEL: U.S. AND AFRICA

Ambassador John Dinger
Deputy Coordinator for Counterterrorism
U.S. Department of State

Colonel John Mabe, USAF
Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense,
Special Operations and Combating Terrorism

Moderator: Dr. Donald Hanle, JMIC Faculty

Ambassador John Dinger, Deputy Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State and Colonel John Mabe, USAF, representing the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Special Operations and Combating Terrorism, provided the Fellows with an overview of U.S. efforts in the Global War on Terrorism. Ambassador Dinger emphasized that one overriding principle is that the killing of innocent civilians is unacceptable. He emphasized further that terrorism is not just an American problem and that U.S. efforts include building the will and capacity of foreign partners to fight terrorism.

Colonel Mabe emphasized that although U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan remain areas of particular attention, the operations there are not simply focusing only on killing or capturing terrorists. For example, he alluded to upcoming U.S. initiatives that will focus on building the capacity of friends and partners to combat terrorism within their own borders. Colonel Mabe noted that the enemy represents a network using religion and terrorism and that the U.S. uses a strategy of offense while helping create and lead a broad international effort to disrupt and attack terrorist networks and counter the ideology behind terrorism.

PANEL DISCUSSION

Following their formal remarks, Ambassador Dinger and Colonel Mabe entertained questions from the Fellows in the form of a panel discussion. The question and answer session is summarized below:

International Fellow: We are not fighting Islam, but a distortion of Islam. What do you think these distortions are? Should not we be targeting terrorist disinformation as a solution?

Ambassador Dinger: We should have the populations de-legitimize terrorism itself. Terrorism should be looked upon the same as slavery, piracy, and other international, universal crimes.

International Fellow: What is the U.S. doing to stop the ideological terrorist strategy of promoting the image of the U.S. as a source of blame?

Ambassador Dinger: While elimination of the relative deprivation that creates resentment toward the United States would help, we should really focus on making terrorism itself unpopular.

International Fellow: Prior to September 11th, terrorism was just terrorism. After September 11th, terrorism was given an Islamic face and the United States was portrayed as a victim. Do you think terrorism is really religious, or is the U.S. foreign policy on the Middle East being used by terrorists to create hate toward the United States?

Ambassador Dinger: Religion is not the focus, but we must address Muslim extremists before we look at other motivators.

International Fellow: If offensive strategies are preferred for fighting the Global War on Terrorism, what other means could you use?

Ambassador Dinger: We would actually prefer not to undertake offensives with military force and instead work to make terrorism itself unpopular.

International Fellow: Where is the U.S. propaganda mechanism against terrorist extremist ideology? I am a Muslim and I do not buy into Osama Bin Laden's words. I do not believe you are doing a good job on this front.

Ambassador Dinger: Public diplomacy is our version of what I imagine some might call propaganda. We have a new person in the U.S. State Department taking on doing a better job of this.

International Fellow: If U.S. strategy focuses on building the capabilities of its friends, what is being done in Africa?

Colonel Mabe: The United States has two programs: equipping and training our individual partners through Joint Combined Training Exercises and the Global Peace Operations Initiative.

Ambassador Dinger: Africa is one of our most focused regions for building partnerships. We used to rely solely on engagement, but now we also focus on counterterrorism efforts on a smaller scale. A larger effort to involve more countries in the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative is being pursued. Another effort is the East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative.

The Fellows concluded by discussing whether there was an adequate international legal means of dealing with terrorism that hinders counterterrorism efforts in most countries. One International Fellow related that because of the absence of a legal regime to handle terrorist suspects in his country, the government released terrorist suspects. This was because of old laws that were fashioned to minimize government abuse against political opposition and democratic expansion. Another International Fellow commented

that terrorism was a global problem and that we should have a global court to handle it. Colonel Mabe responded that there are many issues related to this and that we must cooperate with other states to find a solution.




Colonel Mabe and Ambassador Dinger, seated, answer questions by the Fellows about the U.S. Global War on Terrorism while Dr. Don Hanle moderates

TRANSNATIONAL MEDICAL INTELLIGENCE ISSUES IN AFRICA


Ms. Rainie Dasch
Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center

Moderator: Dr. Pauletta Otis, JMIC Faculty

Ms. Rainie Dasch, an Analyst from the Defense Intelligence Agency's Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC), covered the Center's mission, addressed current and expected future transnational medical intelligence issues, and highlighted specific medical issues in Africa. Ms. Dasch indicated that medical intelligence information products provide support to many levels of governmental efforts, including offices that engage in the practice of medicine and in combating infectious diseases. As part of its mission, AFMIC produces intelligence information products on the following: health risk assessments, health services assessments, medical indications and warning, medical trends and forecasts, interoperability of military and civilian health care systems, and the location, capabilities, quality, and mass casualty readiness of fixed and field hospitals. Other areas where AFMIC products make a contribution are in the bioscience and environmental health fields, as well as in military operations from strategic (global) to tactical (battle-




Leading Killers-2002



Source: World Health Organization

2002 Deaths by Region



Source: World Health Organization

Infectious Diseases

Other Causes

New & Re-emergent Infectious Diseases

2005	Avian Flu	Asia
2004	Influenza H5:N1	Asia
2003	SARS	Asia, N. America
2003	Ebola	Congo
2001	FMD	UK
2001	Rift Valley fever	Mideast
2000	Ebola	Uganda
1999	Nipah Virus	Malaysia
1999	West Nile	US
1997-98	Rift Valley fever	Africa
1997	Influenza H5:N1	Hong Kong
1996	BSE	UK
1995	Ebola	DROC
1994	Plague	India


Diseases of Military Concern

-  **AIDS**
-  **Dengue**
-  **Diarrheal**
-  **Japanese Encephalitis B**
-  **Leishmaniasis**
-  **Malaria**
-  **Respiratory**
-  **STDs**
-  **Tuberculosis**

field). These products can be particularly useful in a variety of situations, including those where we are facing or engaged in an evolving military strategy in an unfamiliar or hostile environment.

Ms. Dasch stated that the global health care community approximately every six months struggles to treat patients for a new or re-emergent infectious disease. She noted that since 1973 some 30 new and 20 re-emergent diseases have infected large numbers of people around the world. She provided an overview of global and regional deaths from various infectious diseases, highlighting the most notable outbreaks of diseases in various locations during the past ten years, and identified the most common diseases of military concern.

Ms. Dasch stated that future environmental health-related illness and death will affect millions of the world's population due to rapid industrialization and urbanization, pollution and waste dumping, illegal drug distribution, radiological events, and environmental terrorism. She noted that the future state of health care in the developing world by 2025 will not be able to meet even the basic needs of patients in Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and parts of Latin America. She predicted that endemic, emerging, and re-emerging diseases will overwhelm health care delivery systems and place more demands on coalitions, non-governmental organizations, and the World Health Organization. Her predictions were based in part on the poor quality of existing civilian healthcare in regions depicted below:



DISCUSSION

One issue that generated lively discussion was Ms. Dasch's comments about the controversy over the acceptance of genetically modified foods in Africa. One U.S. Fellow commented that Zambia was among several southern African countries which banned genetically modified food relief in 2002, at a time when it was facing critical food shortages. This eventually led to the U.S. government decision to donate 30,000 metric tons of non-genetically modified sorghum and bulgur wheat to Zambia in February 2003. In December 2004, an Angolan law banning the import and use of genetically modified foods came into effect. The law prohibits the entry of genetically modified seeds and grains unless destined only for food relief. But even food-aid grains, like maize, must be milled before being distributed to beneficiaries, either before arriving in country or soon after. The current situation is problematic given southern Africa's persistent grain shortage since 2000, when the negative impact Zimbabwe's land program began being felt both domestically and regionally.

One International Fellow mentioned that polio vaccines supplied in a predominantly Muslim part of his country were initially viewed as an anti-Muslim plot by local governments. He indicated that a contaminated lot at the start of the vaccination effort compounded the problem. However, he added that after subsequent testing authenticated the quality and purpose of the vaccines, inoculations proceeded without major problems. Another International Fellow added that in his country, if doctors do not adequately inform the populace about the possible side effects of a vaccine, then when side effects occur, this is interpreted by the people receiving the vaccine as an attempt to kill them.

An International Fellow opined that according to Ms. Dasch's briefing, transnational medical issues essentially remain the same as in 1900. This International Fellow further asked what diseases were being encountered in Sudan that could impact his country's peacekeeping forces. For example, he noted that malaria and polio are problems due to the lack of immunization. He also raised the unresolved problem of venomous snakes, because antivenin requires refrigeration, a capability that many international peacekeeping forces do not have in the field.

Another International Fellow identified his country's biggest medical challenge as the Marburg virus, which requires human touching of bodies for it to spread. Because human touching is a common cultural practice, the government and NGOs must warn against this practice as potentially lethal. Finally, an International Fellow asked why there has been a rise of hypertension and stroke among Africans. In response, another International Fellow opined that in his observation Africans have changed their diet and life style as well as ingesting increasing amounts of cholesterol-laden foods.



Ms. Rainie Dasch (AFMIC) provided the Fellows with an overview of transnational medical intelligence issues

COMPLEXITIES OF MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS CHALLENGES IN AFRICA

His Excellency Dr. Zac Nsenga Rwandan Ambassador to the United States

Multinational intelligence cooperation depends on mutual understanding of the complexities of various types of multinational operations. His Excellency Dr. Zac Nsenga, Rwandan Ambassador to the United States, addressed some of those complexities for multinational operations in Africa.

Ambassador Nsenga explained that during the Cold War, United Nations peacekeeping operations were meant to resolve conflicts between states. However, withdrawal of the two superpowers' support led to the collapse of many African states. Regional intra-state conflicts in Africa became severe, complex, and frequent. There were examples of terror and genocide in countries such as Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The ambassador emphasized the need for United Nations reform and for the United Nations Security Council to be ready to issue unequivocal and appropriate mandates that address situations such as in Rwanda and the DRC. He also described how important it was for decisionmakers to have effective intelligence and information about all aspects of conflict, terrain, and culture in crisis areas.

Ambassador Nsenga indicated that successful international intervention to solve complex humanitarian problems requires the United Nations to issue clear Chapter 7 peace enforcement mandates and frameworks for peace. He emphasized that the international community must "stay the course" in following through with providing financial, logistics, material, and political support to help resolve conflicts. He reminded the Fellows that challenges facing the United Nations include lack of political will, poor planning processes, budget constraints, increasing international demands, and the absence of a United Nations Standby Force for intervention. The Ambassador noted that challenges for the African Union include poor infrastructure, weak national institutions, and lack of an African Union Standby Force.

Ambassador Nsenga spoke about other steps that need to be taken, and offered the following suggestions:

- Strengthen the African Union through New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) initiatives to improve its infrastructure, political and economic governance, trade, aid, and debt relief.
- Create a United Nations Standby Force and an African Union Standby Force that are fully trained and equipped.
- Increase financial and logistical resources for peacekeeping operations in Africa from G-8, European Union, and United Nations member contributions.

- Improve coordination within and between the United Nations and African regional organizations to mobilize the political will to act in conflict situations.

Ambassador Nsenga's briefing is outlined below:

Complexities of Multinational Operations:
Challenges of current and future MNO in
Africa.

By
Dr. Zac Nsenga

Rwandan Ambassador to the United States
At
Joint Military Intelligence College,
Washington, D.C.

June 24th 2005

1

1.0. BACKGROUND

- Power from the UN Charter to UNSC to take collective action to maintain global peace and security.
- UNSC sole organ to authorize and command such a multinational global peacekeeping operation.
- UNSC could delegate by authorizing
 - Regional organizations (NATO, AU, ECOWAS etc..)
 - Coalitions of the willing (Iraq, Afghanistan)

2

Background ctd.

- Traditional peacekeeping (during Cold War) meant to resolve conflicts between (belligerent) states and premised on:
 - Consent of both parties committed to a signed peace accord
 - Total cessation of hostilities
 - Impartiality of peacekeepers
 - Intervention only in self defense

3

Background ctd

- End of Cold War era (especially in Africa)
 - Interest of the Western nations diminished in favor of the Eastern block
 - Withdrawal of superpower support led to state collapse.
 - Conflict became intra-state, severe (terror, genocide), complex and frequent. (Rwanda, DRC, Liberia, S/Leone, Ivory Coast, Burundi, Darfur...)
 - Breakdown of existing socio-economic infrastructure leading to poverty and disease epidemics

4

2.0. Complex Humanitarian Intervention

Focus on Protection as well as political and developmental aspects:

Need to:

- Protect civilian population and provide humanitarian assistance
- Re-establish order, state and civil institutions and facilitate political settlement
- Oversee DDR, De-mining and Elections...
- Transitional Justice, Accountability, and Reconciliation
- socio-economic rehabilitation

5

3.0. Required for successful Intervention

- Political will from member states.
- Properly trained peacekeepers (doctrine, peace enforcement, diplomatic ...)
- Invoke chapter 7 with clear mandate and rules of engagement to achieve the above
- Adequate intelligence on the situation (conflict, terrain, culture...)
- Adequate financial and logistical support.

6

Required for Intervention ctd

- Effective coordination (UN, member states and regional organizations)
- Well negotiated and clear peace agreement. If not available, facilitate one in order to get a blue print for implementation
- The international community must be ready to stay the course until stability

7

4.0. Challenges

UN:

- Political will – no unanimity due to overriding national interest, less interest in Africa and colonial mentalities of some key members
- Poor planning, coordination and bureaucracy
- Budgetary constraints – member state contributions are low(0.7% GDP)
- Increasing demand on the Un and member states due to many conflicts and other global threats e.g terrorism,disease epidemics...
- No UN standby force

8

Challenges ctd

Africa (AU):

- No stand by AU force – regional forces not harmonized and not adequately trained for MNOs
- Poor Infrastructure logistical and financial constraints
- Weak national institutions (socio-economic and political). This undermines regional capacity to prevent and manage conflicts.

9

5.0. What Needs to be Done

- Strengthening AU through NEPAD initiative – (Infrastructure, political and economic governance, trade, Aid, debt relief...)
- Creation of an African standby force) (train, equip, coordinate)
- Reform the UN so that it is more effective, responsive and delegative
- Well trained and harmonized Standby UN-commanded force.
- UNSC should be ready to issue unequivocal and appropriate mandate (Rwanda, DRC)

10

What Needs to be Done ctd

- Increase financial and logistical resources for peacekeeping – G8, EU, member contributions
- Better coordination within and between UN and regional organizations and mobilization of political will to act
- The international community should stay the course until stability and sustainability.
- UN to explore the concept of coalition of the willing. Motivated, like minded member states could be useful (Afghanistan and Gulf War).

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DISCUSSION

Following his formal remarks, Ambassador Nsenga engaged in a discussion with the Fellows. A U.S. Fellow asked the Ambassador about the challenges to ongoing peacekeeping operations in Rwanda. He replied that no resistance to operations in Rwanda existed and that there is support from the African Union. However, he noted that there are problems with logistics, particularly in the area of transportation, and that there needs to be more training for peacekeeping personnel because peacekeeping operations are very demanding. An International Fellow commented that the Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda (FDLR), a group responsible for the 1994 Rwandan genocide, proclaimed that it wants to return to Rwanda. However, the Pretoria Accord requires that the group first be disarmed. Ambassador Nsenga responded that the FDLR “wanted a slice” from the United Nations and that FDLR “diehards” want to come back to Rwanda to take over. He pointed out that none of the FDLR members want to return to the six Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) camps.

The Ambassador added that to prevent misunderstandings in these types of situations, it is important that the United Nations have a clear mandate. For example, the multinational force in the Congo has a United Nations mandate to focus on one armed group. Another armed group is also part of the problem, yet it falls outside of the mandate. Ambassador Nsenga pointed out that no African Union member state is a permanent representative in the United Nations Security Council, and therefore no African voice exists with enough power to influence the United Nations when it considers the deployment of United Nations peacekeeping forces to areas of conflict. He argued for an African country, with veto power, to be part of a broader United Nations Security Council entity.

An International Fellow asked Ambassador Nsenga whether the militaries from Anglophone and Francophone countries in Africa had difficulties working together during joint and multinational peacekeeping operations in Africa, such as in Cote d’Ivoire. In response, Ambassador Nsenga stated that he did not believe there was an “Anglophone-Francophone divide” between African military personnel from different countries that contribute personnel for multinational operations in Africa. However, he pointed out that a lack of standardized training and guiding doctrine for African peacekeeping forces adds to the difficulty of peacekeeping missions in Africa. He emphasized that unified and standardized training of African personnel is required. Ambassador Nsenga added that the multinational peacekeeping operation in Cote d’Ivoire was not that much different from other operations in Africa. What is important is that there is a good effort there by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and that the African Union is also engaged. Ambassador Nsenga insisted that the United Nations has “to stay the course” in ensuring that peacekeeping forces are supported with the resources to accomplish the political and military mandates in all its peacekeeping missions in Africa.

Another International Fellow agreed with Ambassador Nsenga’s comments that there are no longer traditional peacekeeping operations (PKO) where multinational forces are just “sitting in the middle of warring factions.” The Fellow added that in this “third generation of PKO, it is complex and needs firm mandates in the form of United Nations Chapter 7 provisions...We do not need a 6 1/2 mandate!” Another International

Fellow stated that the military forces of most countries can successfully conduct United Nations Chapter 6 peacekeeping operations, but many cannot afford or are unable to conduct Chapter 7 peace enforcement operations. Lastly, another International Fellow noted that despite the availability of adequate intelligence and information to support peacekeeping operations, there is often a lack of political will, which results in inaction.



General Joulwan greets Ambassador Nsenga prior to his address to the 2005 International Intelligence Fellows



Ambassador Nsenga is presented with a Certificate of Appreciation from Mr. Hiponia following his address to the International Fellows

COMPLEXITIES OF MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS U.S. CJTF PLANNING AND PRE-DEPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS

General George A. Joulwan, USA (Ret)
Major General William L. Nash, USA (Ret)

General Joulwan and Major General Nash provided the International Fellows with their perspectives about key planning and pre-deployment challenges that U.S. and NATO Combined Joint Task Force commanders have had with respect to multinational operations within the U.S. European Command area of responsibility.

General Joulwan commanded the U.S. Southern Command and U. S. European Command, and was the 11th Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. He established the first-ever strategic policy for U.S. military engagement in Africa. He also was the overall military commander for the NATO-led implementation and Stabilization Forces (IFOR/SFOR) that resulted from the Dayton Peace Accords. General Joulwan emphasized that multinational force commanders must anticipate how they can work together for effectiveness in the field. He cited four conditions for successful multinational operations:

- Clarity of the mission
- Unity of command
- Robust rules of engagement
- Timely political decisions

General Joulwan then engaged in a discussion with the Fellows while recounting several instances where the lack of clear, definitive, and timely mandates for multinational military peacekeeping and security missions proved challenging to commanders in the field. The General recalled that although the NATO mission in Bosnia had been anticipated by his command for two years, the 14 December 1995 Dayton Agreement for Bosnia required the attendant military mission to begin just six days later on 20 December. He also commented that clear rules of engagement need to be specified in United Nations Chapter 7 mandates for peace enforcement operations. The General also opined that it was a “6.5” United Nations mandate that led to the massacre of civilians in Srebrenica, Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995.

General Joulwan emphasized that the military must be a catalyst for change and that officers must provide civilian leadership with information that is likely to impact policy. This takes courage. An International Fellow commented that intelligence may provide information to the right people, but “political will” may be lacking. A U.S. Fellow commented that intelligence leaders must frame their analysis to remind the political decision-makers of the potential consequences resulting from policy decisions.



General Joulwan imparted his views on planning and pre-deployment challenges in multinational operations

Following the discussions with General Joulwan, the International Fellows next engaged in a discussion with Major General Nash about his perspectives on the challenges facing multinational peacekeeping operations. Major General Nash, Director of the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations, has extensive experience in peacekeeping operations, both as a military commander in Bosnia and as a civilian administrator for the United Nations in Kosovo.



Major General Nash discusses the importance of mission analysis, commander's intent, and civil-military coordination for success in multinational operations

General Nash began by emphasizing that peacekeeping operations are complex because they are the continuation of politics by other means. He explained that Clausewitz was correct to note that military operations are tied to political goals. Next, he emphasized six issues that leaders must focus on to achieve success in multinational peacekeeping operations:

- **Intelligence.** The relationship between the Intelligence Officer (J-2) and the mission Commander is critical. Success comes not from what the J-2 or the Commander do individually; it arises from what they do together.
- **Mission Clarity.** Ensure that you get clarity of your mission's purpose from political leaders.
- **Mission Analysis.** You must do good mission analysis. Use mission analysis to identify gaps in clarity and then re-engage political leaders for guidance and direction. Establish good measures of success so that you know how you are doing and whether you are reaching political objectives. Intelligence has to be involved in mission analysis. Clarity of the mission relates to the quality of mission analysis, focusing on measures of success.
- **Commander's Intent.** U.S. Commanders personally write the Commander's Intent section of an operation order. While standard U.S. military doctrine prescribes that the Commander's Intent should be understood two echelons down, General Nash recommends that Commander's Intent should be understood by commanders in peacekeeping operations at least three echelons downward, from division through company levels. He emphasized that Commander's Intent must allow subordinate commanders the ability to act without specific instructions in fluid situations. Standards of contact must be known by everyone.
- **Framework for Multinational Operations.** General Nash favors the concept of multinational operations and views NATO as the model organization. He noted that a good framework for the organization is important. An appropriate focus for commanders in multinational operations is determining which tasks and missions are best suited for particular member states. The General also related that in his experience, when foreign contingents realized they were receiving equal treatment and concern by the overall force commander, there would be greater cooperation. Thus one could draw on each contingent's strength.
- **Civil-Military Coordination.** Civil and military cooperation is an issue of unity. Peace depends on political, economic, and social development. Civil and military organizations must have more than cooperation, "you don't just want to get along, you want to get something done."

During the discussion period that followed General Nash's formal presentation, one of the International Fellows asked what accounts for the impatience of the international community regarding peacekeeping operations. In response, General Nash commented on the need to stay on course for a long period to achieve success with multinational peacekeeping operations. He explained that initially, there is naiveté about the costs and length of peacekeeping interventions. He noted that there are no examples of short *and* success-

ful interventions. For example, while the Dayton Accords were not perfect, the military missions were clear. Because of the military's crucial role for the last ten years, the region is now achieving success on social, political, and economic issues.

The General reiterated that early mission analysis is good in that it can prepare you for the long-term consequences. On the other hand, it is bad in that it may scare you out of the mission. He added that the political leaders of the major countries contributing forces to peacekeeping missions need to understand the size and scope of the commitment. Efforts must also be made to maintain public domestic and international support.

Another International Fellow asked General Nash about his views on exit strategies. General Nash responded that exit strategies are essentially the same for most situations: establishing democracy, the rule of law, and a free-market economy. There are no exclusive military solutions; rather, the military is an agent of change for keeping the peace and achieving political, economic, and social solutions.



Major General Nash is presented with a Certificate of Appreciation by Mr. Hiponia for his participation in the 2005 International Intelligence Fellows Program

INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES IN A MULTINATIONAL FRAMEWORK

A UNITED NATIONS PERSPECTIVE

Brigadier General Francois Dureau, France (Ret)
Director, Situation Centre, Department of Peacekeeping
United Nations Headquarters

The following are the prepared remarks by Mr. Francois Dureau, Director of the Situation Centre, Department of Peacekeeping, United Nations Headquarters, on information-sharing and intelligence support to peacekeeping operations from the United Nations (UN) perspective. Mr. Dureau was accompanied by Mr. Richard Manlove, Senior Security Coordination Officer, Department of Safety and Security, United Nations.


Mr. Dureau: With 18 missions deployed throughout the world, often in high-risk environments, the need for the UN to develop and maintain a multinational information-sharing capacity may be quite obvious to most of those who have a military or police background or operational experience in the field. However, not everyone shares a similar view, including some among the Member States. It is all the more surprising since United Nations peacekeeping today is represented by over 80,000 personnel, and this number is still growing. This total figure breaks down as follows: 65,000 troops, more than 2,000 unarmed military observers and almost 6,000 civilian police personnel. They are engaged in an increasing number of tasks, all of them mandated by the Security Council. They are supported by 15,000 international and nationally recruited civilian personnel. Ongoing UN peacekeeping, political and peace-building missions are depicted on the next page.

As we are two “operators,” from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Safety and Security (DSS) respectively, and as we are actively engaged in operational and security issues related to our daily field activities, we would like to give you a brief overview of how we deal with information-sharing and tell you very informally about how we look at intelligence gathering in UN Peacekeeping. However, prior to getting into the heart of the matter let me briefly set the stage and make three comments.


MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS AND COMPLEXITY

First, UN peacekeeping does not operate in isolation. UN peacekeeping forces are generally on the ground as part of a wider international approach. UN Peacekeeping is just one of those tools at the disposal of the International Community through the UN Secretary General. UN Peacekeeping operations and activities are complementary to other crucial and increasingly complex endeavors, which are not military by nature, that are carried out by the UN Secretariat, the UN family and the International Community as a whole. As a growing number of international organizations and actors are engaging in post-conflict work, it is incumbent on us to develop new cooperation and coordina-

ONGOING PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS



ONGOING POLITICAL AND PEACE-BUILDING MISSIONS



tion mechanisms at the strategic and tactical level. It also requires the establishment of more formal and more detailed operational and organizational information-sharing arrangements and technical bridges.

THREATS AND SECURITY

Second, current operational environments are increasingly exposing UN personnel to exceptional threats that go well beyond common banditry and petty crime. Attacks against the UN are increasingly politically motivated. We know since the bombing of our Baghdad Headquarters in August 2003 that we are an easy target. The incidence of internal armed conflicts and more recently the direct threat of terrorism, which directly applies to the UN, have their impact on the way we look at security in our operations. Peace accords, which are a prerequisite for our deployments, do not provide a bullet-proof guarantee. A common factor throughout our missions is that we cannot assume that the security situation is under the control of any local security forces. Hostilities may resume at no notice. The concept of the host nation providing for security of UN personnel does not stand a reality check in most peacekeeping deployments. In certain cases the Mission is the *de facto* executive authority. We know for a fact that most transitional or interim governments or former parties to the conflict are not able to live up to their commitment to provide security to the UN and international workers in the areas under their responsibility. In certain cases, such party-provided security may even become a source of increased risk for UN staff, in addition to representing a major political liability for the Mission. Overall, State security is at the best minimal, and more often completely absent. Hence there is a critical need for information-sharing to prevent possible attacks on UN personnel and equipment.

LACK OF INFORMATION-SHARING AND ANALYSIS

Third, while the UN senior leadership, including those in peacekeeping, and Members States do acknowledge the need to develop system-wide capacities to support information-sharing, analysis and decision-making, there has been no significant progress in the past five years. In the wake of the Brahimi Report in the summer of 2000 and the Baghdad tragedy, peace operations have still to adjust to the information age. The UN as a whole has still to develop a credible strategy to meet key informational and analytical requirements both at Headquarters and in the field. In the absence of an overarching information management strategy, the UN Secretariat, and as a consequence DPKO and DPKO-led missions, still suffer severe deficiencies in this respect. There is still no institutionalized UN information-sharing platform that could be used among the members of the Secretariat, and beyond it to connect with the UN family, and all external partners. There is no protocol or memorandum of understanding to support bi-lateral or multilateral interaction and provide for interoperable information technology links and procedures at Headquarters and Field level. The requirement for a true information management capability to support risk analysis and decision-making on the ground and at Headquarters still remains a critical challenge within the UN.

PEACEKEEPING AND INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

UN peacekeeping operations are by essence information-gathering and reporting mechanisms. If you look at the traditional observer missions, you can see that they are designed for optimizing information-gathering through monitoring, observation and liaison. The very role of observers is, indeed, their ability to identify and collect information of a relevant nature. They are the “Eyes and Ears” of the Secretary-General on the ground. By extension, a similar role is expected today from all components of any multidimensional peacekeeping mission, including on political, humanitarian, and human rights issues that may affect a peace process. As a matter of fact, the whole peace support system under the three lead-entities in the Secretariat (the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Political Affairs, and the Office of the Coordinator of Humanitarian Affairs) is precisely aimed at collecting first-hand information and to analyze such information. This forms the basis for the formal briefings or written reports that are presented by the Secretary-General to the executive bodies of the UN, the Security Council and the General Assembly.

Moving away from traditional peacekeeping and its associated tasks of monitoring a cease-fire line, a buffer zone or a Weapon-Free Zone in an interposition mode, today’s complex operations require balancing and integrating of many political, humanitarian and operational elements. While such deployments are expected to manage increasingly complex operations in highly insecure environments, they must address simultaneously multiple, interdependent problems that reflect the growing complexity of post-conflict transitions. I would like to mention a number of them that are parts of the tasks that are carried out by a number of peacekeeping operations, in particular in Africa. The following example is taken from the recent resolution extending the mandate of UNOCI in Cote d’Ivoire (Resolution 1609 of 24 June 2005). In this resolution, the Council mandates the following tasks to UNOCI:

- Monitoring, observing and eventually preventing activities of armed militias and rogue elements. Gathering information on their organizations, structures, ethnic base, leadership and affiliation, financing and external operational and logistics support, supply routes;
- Supporting the extension of state authority; (Sierra Leone, Timor L’este, Afghanistan, Haiti, Liberia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC));
- Supporting security sector reforms and national law enforcement authorities;
- Supporting disarmament, demobilization and reintegration exercises;
- Reporting on arms trafficking and cross-border activities;
- Monitoring and reporting on illicit exploitation of natural resources;
- Monitoring and reporting on gold, diamonds and other precious minerals trafficking;
- Monitoring and observing arms embargoes.

THE UN APPROACH TO THE USE OF INTELLIGENCE

Peacekeeping information gathering and assessment tools are demanding in terms of information requirements. How do we go about it? In this context, you may appreciate the need for the UN field missions to gather more relevant and credible information on a larger number of broad and complex issues in order to fulfill their mandate. You cannot support and help if you don't understand!

In this regard and in the absence of a approved concept and dedicated supporting system for gathering and analyzing data and raw information, (i.e. an intelligence-gathering system) that may be relevant to our field operations and activities, I would like to mention that we are extremely dependent on additional sources of information, including intelligence from Member States and International Organizations. However, we are aware that such a process is a two-way street and therefore turns into an *exchange* of information on an ad-hoc basis. In this context, the UN is not only a recipient of information; it may become a source of information as well.

The challenge that we face in this regard is the protection and further use within the UN system of sensitive information provided by external partners. Given that the UN is composed of 191 Member States and that the UN wants to retain its image of transparency and impartiality, it is not only difficult to retain control of a specific piece of sensitive information, but also to use intelligence per se to influence decision-making. There



have been a lot of discussions on the concept of “intelligence” as applied to UN peace-keeping activities. Today, the subject is still a complex and controversial one because the word “intelligence” carries a negative connotation when applied to the UN in general and peacekeeping in particular.

BACKGROUND: AT THE UN HEADQUARTERS LEVEL


Efforts over the last decade to develop the security and information-gathering capability of the UN system have been met by reservations and suspicion by the Member States. In August 2000, the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations recommended the creation in the Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS) of an Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (EISAS). ECPS is one of the “highest policy development and management instruments within the UN Secretariat on critical cross-cutting issues of peace and security,” created in 1997 in the framework of UN reform. It was proposed that the bulk of EISAS should be formed by the consolidation of the various departmental units that are assigned policy and information analysis roles related to peace and security, including the Policy Analysis Unit of the Secretary-General’s Office and the Situation Centre of the DPKO. All subsequent recommendations in the report regarding information technology enhancement, including GIS (Geographic Information Systems) and an electronic data clearing house, as well as knowledge management, were all based on the assumption that the EISAS concept would be approved. Unfortunately, the General Assembly decided not to implement this proposal for reasons I am not going to detail here.


THE UN SITUATION CENTRE

During the 1990s the DPKO Situation Centre hosted a number of Military Officers with an intelligence background to form the Information and Research Unit (I&R). Although the I&R Unit had been discontinued in 1998-1999, the Situation Centre has retained an ad-hoc information exchange function consistent with its daily monitoring role, crisis response capability and my personal role as security focal point in DPKO. In my view, it is critical that a structure like the Situation Centre in the DPKO be able to maintain at all times three key operational functions:

- Monitoring developments on the ground (Situational Awareness);
- Liaising with external partners and member states;
- Providing analyses and assessments to senior managers.

Despite the lack of support for the establishment of a formal intelligence structure, there is a de facto arrangement through the daily work of the Situation Centre, as depicted below.





COOPERATION WITH REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

A couple of weeks ago, we organized a two-day seminar in New York with the heads of the Situation Centres and Operations Centres of several major international organizations, including NATO, OSCE, the European Union, the African Union, and the UN family—UNHCR, WFP, and UNICEF—to look at the way we conduct our day-to-day activities and respond to emergencies in the field. We wanted also to grab this opportunity to see how we could share information on subjects and areas of common interest.

I must say that it was a most gratifying experience to see that everyone was eager to promote better cooperation and coordination through a number of technical arrangements despite the constraints of our respective organizations. We realized that we were facing similar challenges when it comes to assessing situations on the ground and supporting our organizations' response to complex emergencies. Let me give you a few practical examples of multinational information-sharing based on ongoing operations:

- With the European Union (EU): the UN DPKO has established an excellent cooperation framework. As you know, the European Commission heads the department that is responsible for economic reconstruction, a pillar of our Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Some 36,000 troops (80 per cent of the total force)

and 800 civilian police are from EU member states serving alongside other international partners. In 2004, the EU's Operation ALTHEA took over from NATO's SFOR military operation in Bosnia. In 2003, Operation ARTEMIS, the European Union's first peacekeeping mission outside Europe, was deployed under a UN mandate in the Democratic Republic of Congo at the beginning of June 2003. Some 1,850 troops from nine countries took part in the French-led mission to protect civilians after inter-ethnic clashes claimed hundreds of lives within weeks in the regional capital Bunia and outlying areas of Ituri province. Since then an EU-UN Steering Committee has been formed and meets every six months. We exchange unclassified reports with the EU Situation Centre. A protocol to exchange classified information up to "EU restricted" is under preparation. Meanwhile, the EU is considering the deployment of a full-time liaison officer to the Situation Centre.

- With NATO: since the operation in Kosovo in 1999 and the establishment of the UN Mission there, NATO headquarters has appointed a full-time liaison officer at the UNHQ. This Officer sits in the Situation Centre. He has his own secure communications channels to Brussels. We exchange information and general assessments on the situation in Kosovo, in Afghanistan and in Sudan. There are also regular meetings in New York and in Brussels and regular video-conferencing between high officials of the two organizations to discuss strategic issues. Such video conferences are now using secure video links.
- With the African Union (AU): as the AU becomes increasingly engaged in peacekeeping operations in Africa, on its own or along with the UN, including in the Darfur region of Sudan, we have been actively engaged in assisting the establishment of the AU Situation Room in Addis-Ababa. This is a joint UN-US-UK-EU effort aimed at eventually giving a full-fledged monitoring capacity to the Organization in support of the Conflict Management Division and the Peace and Security Directorate of the AU. Recently a group of AU staff spent three weeks at UNHQ to familiarize themselves with our structures and procedures. While the flow of exchange with the AU Situation Room is minimal at this stage, there is no doubt that this will increase as its capacity develops.
- With the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS): while the cooperation between the UN and ECOWAS has been ongoing on the ground for more than ten years now (Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire), we have yet to formalize specific coordination and information-sharing arrangements. This is planned for 2005, and ECOWAS has expressed its interest on many occasions in receiving a UN assistance team in Abuja to further develop its own command and control and monitoring capacities.

Cooperation with regional organizations at Headquarters

- **EU**
(Balkans, Europe, Haiti and Africa)
- **NATO**
(Balkans, Afghanistan, Sudan)
- **AU**
(All African peacekeeping missions)
- **ECOWAS**
(All peacekeeping missions in West Africa)

INTELLIGENCE AT THE FIELD LEVEL

Intelligence in the field filters through the Joint Operations Centre (JOC) and the Joint Mission Analysis Cell (JMAC), a newly established concept in peacekeeping. While the JOC is providing the watch and emergency response capacity in military terms, the JMAC provides for the fusion of all-source information such as political, humanitarian, civil and military, as well as that originating from national security authorities and diplomatic sources. As a mission tool, the JMAC should be capable of providing in-depth current and mid-term analysis on issues affecting the mission. Thus, the JMAC is not a military organization. It is “joint” in terms of having civilian, military and police components. A range of traditional intelligence tools will be used to direct the effort of the JMAC. The overarching effort will be embedded in a Collection Plan which will define the collection priorities of the UN sources and agencies. Gaps in information will be identified, and a potential source will be assigned to meet a particular requirement. The JMAC will have the authority to actively seek information and tasks will be levied on all components of the mission. More specifically, Priority Information Requirements (PIRs) will set the priorities for information or subjects of interest to the JMAC. Examples of functioning JMACs include those in Cote d’Ivoire and the DRC.

INFORMATION-GATHERING AT THE FIELD LEVEL

JOINT OPERATIONS CENTRES (JOC)

**GATHERING DAY-TO-DAY OPERATIONAL INFORMATION
PROVIDING 24X7 EMERGENCY RESPONSE CAPACITY**

JOINT MISSION ANALYSIS CELLS (JMAC)

**FUSION OF ALL-SOURCE INFORMATION
LIAISING WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES
LIAISING WITH THE DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY**

REGIONAL COOPERATION ON THE GROUND

When the UN is not directly tasked to provide a security umbrella for the implementation of its programs and activities or where it operates alongside another force, there is a need to coordinate closely and work in association with other military and police components operating under national or multinational command. In such cases, not only does the UN depend on external protection forces to provide for security for its personnel who are carrying out essential tasks related to mandate implementation; it also depends to a large extent on those forces for critical security information. This is currently the case in Afghanistan and Kosovo. This was the case on several occasions in Bosnia (IFOR), East-Timor (INTERFET), Liberia and Sierra Leone (ECOMOG), Burundi (AMIB), Haiti (MNF), and Cote d'Ivoire (ECOFORCE and LICORNE). Therefore, the performance and enhancement of our field operations, activities and programs do rely on a close cooperation and dialogue between the Secretariat, the members of the UN family, regional and sub-regional organizations and, of course, member states.



CONCLUDING REMARKS—THE WAY AHEAD

Things are changing in our operations. They are changing quickly in the overall security environment, and in the magnitude and the diversity of the tasks to be carried out under the Mission's mandate; but they are also changing because of the increasing number of stakeholders and players involved. Peacekeepers alone cannot achieve a lasting peace. The various partners involved in implementing the mandate include the parties to the conflict, the host government, opposition groups, irregular forces as well as administrative entities and other parties such as neighboring countries and communities, civil society and the local population and media. Therefore, there is an increasing dependence on and demand for information. We need to know more!

We are aware of this demand. We are slowly moving toward addressing the demand. Until a more permanent structure is in place, we continue to apply a more "pragmatic" approach in this regard. It is a constant balancing act and there is no quick fix.

Though we try, we should not be unrealistic and think that we can quickly fix the problem. Until such a time, we will remain at the mercy of the Member States.

However, this problem may also be your problem: the problem of organizations such as the AU, ECOWAS, ECCAS which also need this capacity but do not yet have it. You

have to be aware it is not an easy one from a political and technical point of view, and you need to be prepared to assist African peacekeeping as it develops in terms of information-sharing and intelligence support. Properly used, multiple information channels — in the field, as well as at Headquarters, are keys to maintaining open communications and bringing different perspectives together. A two-way comprehensive flow of information between the UN and external partners should provide for better situation awareness, improved crisis response and enhanced security of our personnel.

DISCUSSION

Moderator: Lieutenant Colonel Kris Young, USA JMIC Faculty

Following the formal remarks, Mr. Dureau engaged in a discussion with the Fellows; the following is a summary.

An International Fellow commented that the crucial issue with UN peacekeeping missions is that the lack of specificity in a given mission mandate may become an obstacle and that better processes are needed for the UN Headquarters to empower the mission commander. In response, Mr. Dureau noted that while Chapter 7 mandates can delegate more decision authority to the field level, in any case many field operations do not need to be approved by the UN Headquarters. Mr. Dureau suggested that recent examples of field decision-making in the UN missions in Haiti and the Democratic Republic of Congo underscored his point. He pointed out that in one UN mission, the commander relied heavily on human intelligence (HUMINT) as the primary source of information about the threat environment and that 90 percent of the HUMINT was collected at check points. Mr. Dureau noted that there is a growing need to intercept communications systems of hostile individuals and groups through applying communications intelligence (COMINT) assets. He added that imagery intelligence (IMINT) does not help very much in many situations in the field.

Mr. Dureau was then asked about the status of the UN's Situation Centre and what key obstacles exist to information sharing and analysis. Mr. Dureau replied that UN Situation Centre reports and cables are used to advise the UN DPKO staff at many levels. However, he emphasized that staff members responsible for analyzing and reporting must be able to correctly assess the implications of developing situations in the field and ensure that "red flags" are communicated to decision-makers quickly. In other words, analysts need to explain the meaning of a developing situation and not just provide early warning.

Another International Fellow asked Mr. Manlove about the difficulties with improving security and information support to force protection for UN missions. Mr. Manlove noted that while some political reports "paint a rosy picture" of security in the field, other reports exaggerate hazards to peacekeeping forces, which leads to internal UN debates over whether a PKO mission should continue. Mr. Manlove noted that the UN is implementing new projects to "mitigate danger" in order to facilitate UN peacekeeping mission

operations. Many non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have a lot of valuable information and NGO and UN personnel should meet daily to share information and analysis at the field level in civil-military operations centers.

Next, the discussion focused on the issue of “trust” between multinational staffs when sharing information and intelligence. The discussion moderator, Lieutenant Colonel Kris Young, shared personal insights as to the lack of trust she observed while deployed to Kosovo in support of multinational peacekeeping operations. She recalled that it took months to establish trust with her multinational intelligence counterparts, often through repeat visits “face-to-face.” Mr. Dureau commented that “networking” is important and that intelligence officers need to exchange information so that further interaction can occur.

A U.S. Fellow asked how NGOs complicate the security in UN missions. Mr. Manlove replied that although NGOs are not part of peacekeeping organizations and missions, they are “implementing partners.” He noted that some NGOs become part of a UN mission’s security structure and procedures, although some are reluctant to do so because they do not want to lose their independence. He also commented that the various NGO agendas may be antithetical to the mandate of a particular UN mission. Other NGOs may promote their religious beliefs, thus creating conflicts and increasing tensions in certain UN mission areas.

A question was also raised about attempts at devising different titles and names for intelligence personnel assigned to UN missions in an effort to circumvent UN sensitivities to the use of the word “intelligence.” Mr. Dureau replied that the UN and international militaries that comprise UN missions tend to rely on informal understandings about the designation and roles of intelligence personnel assigned to UN missions. He added that this arrangement has been successful in some instances. Another International Fellow commented that he had observed that designating “intelligence” personnel as “information” personnel has been successful to

a certain extent with every international contingent in UN missions at the operational and tactical levels. Another International Fellow responded that he expected the new African Standby Force, when formed, would not have a problem with designating and assigning military intelligence personnel to its staff. Mr. Dureau also pointed out that although some



Mr. Francois Dureau and Mr. Richard Manlove engaged in a spirited discussion with the International Fellows about information sharing in United Nations missions

UN member states are reluctant to have a JMAC at the tactical level as part of UN missions in the field, he emphasized “that is precisely where it needs to start.”



MULTINATIONAL INFORMATION SHARING A UN PERSPECTIVE

INTELLIGENCE AND UN PEACEKEEPING

Colonel Nicholas “Nick” Seymour, UK Army Chief, Military Planning Service Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations

Colonel Nicholas Seymour, UK, Chief, Military Planning Service, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations Headquarters in New York, provided an overview of the transformation and new initiatives for improving intelligence support to United Nations (UN) multinational peacekeeping missions. He noted that the real difficulty in improving the intelligence process in UN operations is transforming the past “single element approach” to a “joint approach.” He argues that as the UN transitions from traditional to complex peacekeeping missions, it needs to adopt a more active and positive approach to intelligence capabilities. He noted recent progress in training UN military observers, who now have a wider variety of skills and abilities with which to improve information gathering and assessments.

Colonel Seymour explained how information management and analysis is being improved with the implementation of the evolving Joint Mission Analysis Cell (JMAC) concept in various UN peacekeeping missions. He described in detail how the JMAC organization brings an integrated, multi-disciplinary approach to gathering and sharing information. He also noted that the JMAC is not a military intelligence organization, but its structure and resources allow personnel to assess information, provide better warning, to engage in planning, and to coordinate approaches to UN operations. He pointed out that the sensitivities of multinational information sharing and the complexity of UN missions require professional and integrated approaches to improve the relationship between good intelligence and operations and decisions at all levels.



**Colonel Nick Seymour, UK, Chief, Military Planning Service,
Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations**

Colonel Seymour's briefing is outlined below:



Intelligence and UN Peacekeeping

Presentation to the International
Intelligence Fellows Program

Washington – 27 June 2005




The Transition From Traditional To Complex Peacekeeping




From this



To this



What was good for missions in the past is not necessarily appropriate, therefore we need to change the way in which we approach UN peacekeeping



Intelligence in the UN Context

- Sensitivities,
- Growing complexity of the environment,
- Need for a more professional approach,
- Recognition of the relationship between good intelligence and good decisions,
- Need for integrated approach to operations,

Information Management:

- Analysis & advice at the correct level
- Joint Mission Analysis Cell (JMAC)
- Integrated Mission database

Intelligence Led Operations

Effectiveness:

- Proactive operations – TCC mindset
- Operational management
- Joint Operations Centre (JOC) (JLOC)
- Operational depth

JMAC – An Integrated Approach



- Importance of an integrated approach – one missing element can undermine the whole decision making process,
- Lack of an integrated approach will also lead to individual components having their own, often contradictory, versions of a given situation.
- Ensuing advice to mission senior management can be contradictory or confused.
- Problems become crises because they were unforeseen,
- Integrated information management will only be possible if it is handled by an integrated / joint mechanism , the JMAC.

JMAC – What is it?

- A multidisciplinary organisation that undertakes analysis of information from all sources, analyses it and provides **medium and long term intelligence** advice to the senior mission management to assist the decision making process,
- Notwithstanding the JMAC's primary focus on the medium to longer term, those coordinating current operations will be able to draw on its resources,
- It will cover the main functional areas of a mission and contain military, civilian police and civilian experts,
- The JMAC will actively seek information from all sources both in, and outside, the Mission. As such it will be the only information management mechanism with responsibility across the full spectrum of activity,
- While security is not within the JMAC's domain, it will identify certain threats as part of the analysis process and it must work in close conjunction with security personnel.

JMAC – What it is not?

- A military intelligence cell,
- The JMAC will provide intelligence input to current operations but it has **NO** responsibility for coordinating those operations; this is the job of the Joint Operations Cell (JOC),
- It is not in competition with other functional areas with an interest in information management but it is the single integrated focus for producing an comprehensive product,




A New Approach

- **Assessed intelligence**, drawing on multiple sources, producing balanced advice to inform the decision making process of the SRSG and senior management.
- Emphasis on **integrated** approach to medium and long term in the context of mandate implementation,
- Improved **coordination between missions**, and a more balanced approach to regional issues,
- Better warning of potential crises,
- More coordinated approach to key issues such as arms embargos, security incidents etc
- More focused approach overall – **better use of resources**.

JMAC – Current Discussion

- Developing concept
- Removing the ignorance
- Funding
- Approach
- IT / database management
- Implications at UN HQ
- Intelligence sharing
- Importance in the context of other capacity building initiatives, e.g. strategic reserves.
- Doctrine development



Colonel Seymour addressing questions from the International Fellows about information support to United Nations peacekeeping missions

INTELLIGENCE IN AFRICAN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

THE DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, AND REINTEGRATION (DDR) PROCESSES

Mr. Mark Malan

Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center

Mr. Malan is the Director of the Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution Department at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Accra, Ghana. Prior to this appointment in February 2004, he headed the Training for Peace Program at the Institute for Security Studies in Pretoria, South Africa, where he oversaw the preparation of indigenous Southern African capacities for participation in peacekeeping and peace-building missions.


Mr. Malan prepared a paper titled “Intelligence in African Peace Operations: Meeting the Need?” for presentation to the 2005 International Intelligence Fellow. It is reproduced below. Intelligence support to peace and stability operations is the topic of the new DOD Directive 3000.05 “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations.” Stability operations cover the spectrum from peace to conflict and establish or maintain order in targeted states and regions. Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) activities are often essential parts of peace and stability operations.

INTRODUCTION

Over the past 15 years, the United Nations and regional security organizations have been called upon to oversee the implementation of a number of detailed peace agreements, which have in turn required field missions to engage in a wide variety of non-military functions. Provision of a stable environment—free of violence and within the rule of law—is central to the transition from a conflicted society to a peaceful one. Peace operations have generally been considered a military problem. However, a multi-dimensional approach including “softer” components is now necessary. Elements that would traditionally be found within the purview of the diplomatic arena are needed at both national and local levels to promote the political settlement of conflict. A major concern, for example, is the negotiation of agreements on the ground at the municipal and community level. Similarly, approaches that have customarily been associated with aid and development organizations are required to address social and economic issues that either caused or contributed to the conflict, or developed as a result of the destruction of the particular country’s social fabric or economy during the period of manifest violence.


Each new peace operation bears little resemblance to its predecessor, and the rapid pace and unplanned nature of these developments have defied scholarly attempts to present to practitioners a clear picture of these new types of operations. Confusion has

A MULTITUDE OF CIVIL, MILITARY AND COMBINED TASKS AND INTERFACES



FEATURES OF PSO

- Intra-state Conflict
- Governments ineffective
- Factional Groupings & Leadership
- Government Infrastructure Broken Down
- Military & Police Breakdown
- Military factions & Warlords
- Weapons proliferation
- There are no Rules
- Judicial Structure Destroyed
- Intermingled with Populations



developed over terminology and definitions, and different countries and organizations attach different meanings to the various terms and definitions that have emerged. The United Nations now favors the term *multifunctional peacekeeping* to refer to the activities of its peacekeepers (military, police and civilian), and the term *integrated mission* to refer to the organizational structure and functioning of its field operations. The terminology *Peace Support Operations* (PSO) is preferred and widely used in the staff colleges of many Anglophone African countries and, for this reason, is used here as an overarching term to refer to “multifunctional operations in which impartial military activities are designed to create a secure environment and to facilitate the efforts of the civilian elements of the mission to create a self sustaining peace.”

INTELLIGENCE AND PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

It is widely accepted that PSO intelligence should be based primarily on open source information. Much is already available from open sources—including that generated by the various UN departments, agencies and associated organizations in the mission

area.¹ Instead of stealing a few secrets, the PSO information community must make sense of vast, overwhelming quantities of non-secret information. UN desk officers and decisionmakers currently use daily situation reports, daily news feeds and informal connections to keep informed of events in their areas of responsibility. However, there are generally no appropriate structures or processes for effective liaison and information analysis.²

Sound planning is based on the realities of the situation and is flexible enough to deal with possible escalation in the expected levels of conflict and destabilization. The need is for accurate, timely information; specifically, the analyzed product that is generally known as intelligence. In past operations, however, there has been a marked scarcity of operational and tactical level intelligence. In fact, there has been no agreed assessment procedure, and the intelligence picture is frequently based on opinion rather than the product of analysis. There has therefore been a lack of warning of potential crises and an ineffective approach to crucial issues such as arms embargos and security threats to mission personnel and host populations.

Brahimi report recommendations to establish a strategic peacekeeping intelligence capability at headquarters have not been implemented,³ largely because of Member State “sensitivity.” The growing operational requirement for intelligence hit home with the tragic loss in 2003 of the Special Representative and the other UN personnel killed in the bomb attack on the UN mission headquarters in Baghdad. UN Member States are at last recognizing that at the operational and tactical levels, the mission leadership needs accurate, relevant information—or intelligence—on the armed groups and former warring factions in order to pre-empt and neutralize destabilizing influences and “spoilers.”

¹ At UN headquarters, a number of units have policy and information analysis roles related to peace and security, including: the Policy Analysis Unit and the Situation Centre of DPKO; the Policy Planning Unit of DPA; the Policy Development Unit of OCHA; the Media Monitoring and Analysis Section of the Department of Public Information (DPI); the Strategic Planning Unit of the Office of the Secretary-General; the Emergency Response Division of UNDP; the Information Analysis Unit of OCHA; the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator; and the Monitoring, Database and Information Branch of the Department for Disarmament Affairs.

² Patrick Cammaert, “Conceptual, Organizational and Operational Issues Facing the United Nations in Providing Strategic Information and Peacekeeping Intelligence for its Peace Support Operations,” paper delivered at the 2nd Annual Peacekeeping Intelligence Conference, Ottawa, 4-5 December 2003. Major General Cammaert is the Military Advisor to the UN Secretary General.

³ In particular, the report recommended that the Secretary-General establish an entity, referred to as the Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS), Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (EISAS), that would support the information and analysis needs of all members of ECPS; for management purposes, it should be administered by and report jointly to the heads of DPA and DPKO. See United Nations General Assembly/Security Council, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, A/55/305, S/2000/809, 21 August 2000, par. 75.

At the operational level, ongoing UN missions in African countries such as the DR Congo, Sierra Leone and Liberia exhibit a strong requirement for a broad spectrum of military information and intelligence products. The parties to the conflicts in these countries have not hesitated to present their own, partial view of incidents to the peacekeeping missions, sometimes even to the Security Council. It is then up to the peacekeepers in the conflict area to support an impartial and, to the extent possible, complete and accurate picture of what happened. The current intelligence picture is based on bilateral agreements, liaison officers, and information from the troops and from the military observers. The biggest challenge the mission leadership faces is getting the necessary information to enable them to remain ahead of the power curve of the “armed groups,” “warring factions,” or “parties,” rather than to merely maintain a reactive “UN presence in the field.”

Whether it be called military information, mission information, or any other name, the need is for analysis of the political, military, humanitarian, socio-economic and security spheres in order for missions to function effectively. The aim of this paper is to highlight the requirements for intelligence in African PSO and to provide insights into how these needs are (or are not) being met. It does so with specific reference to intelligence needs related to arms embargoes and DDR, and to the role played by Military Observers and Political Affairs Officers in PSO. The paper concludes with an overview of ongoing efforts to implement the concept of the Joint Mission Analysis Cell as a solution to the current intelligence deficit.

ARMS EMBARGOES

Nowhere is the challenge of monitoring and enforcing arms embargoes more apparent than in the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). The operation in the Congo began as a modest observer mission in 1999. It has mushroomed into an operation with 16,500 UN soldiers on the ground, with most of the troops provided by India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal. Pursuant to Security Council resolution 1493 (2003) of 28 July 2003, the Security Council imposed an arms embargo, for an initial period of 12 months, in which all member states, including the DRC, were required to take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer of arms and any related material, and of any assistance, advice or training related to military activities to all foreign and Congolese armed groups and militias operating in the territory of North and South Kivu and of Ituri, and to groups not party to the Global and All-inclusive agreement, in the DRC. Shortly prior to the imposition of the arms embargo, there was a noticeable upsurge in supplies to armed groups in the border areas of eastern DRC. These supplies supplemented the pre-existing stock of arms, including residual weapons that remained in the eastern DRC after the withdrawal of Rwandan and Ugandan troops. However, with the intervention of the International Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF's) “Operation ARTEMIS” in mid-2003 in Ituri province, regular supplies by air, water and land were stymied. ARTEMIS applied reconnaissance, information and interdiction assets, enabling it to limit re-supply in its theatre of operations.

The replacement of the IEMF by a less well-equipped MONUC force created, at first, an environment more propitious to the resumption of weapons trafficking and

other logistical support to key actors in Ituri and the Kivus. With the gradual deployment of the Ituri Brigade outside of Bunia, however, MONUC forces were better positioned to fill the power vacuum in the more remote areas. Nevertheless, under resolution 1493, MONUC was tasked to monitor the arms embargo at a time when it lacked both human resources and technical assets, particularly in Ituri and later in the Kivus. Under these conditions, MONUC's limited arms-monitoring capability was stretched to its limit, although MONUC fully appreciated the importance of this task. It is in this context that the three-tier monitoring mechanism was established under resolution 1533 (adopted on 12 March 2004).

Under the first tier, MONUC would collect and categorize relevant information in accordance with its capabilities. Under the second tier, a group of technical experts would collect information and conduct preliminary investigation both within the DRC and in other countries, and report findings to the third tier, a sanctions committee. Resolution 1533 requested the Secretary General, in consultation with the Security Council sanctions committee, to appoint, for a period expiring on 28 July 2004, a group of experts to perform the following tasks:

- To examine and analyze information gathered by MONUC in the context of its monitoring mandate;
- To gather and analyze all relevant information in the DRC, countries of the region and, as necessary, in other countries, in cooperation with the governments of those countries, on flows of arms and related materiel, as well as networks operating in violation of the measures imposed by paragraph 20 of resolution 1493;
- To consider and recommend, where appropriate, ways of improving the capabilities of interested member states, in particular those of the region, to ensure the measures imposed by resolution 1493 are effectively implemented;
- To report to the Council through the Committee, on the implementation of the measures imposed by paragraph 20 of resolution 1493, with recommendations in this regard; and
- To provide the Committee with a list, with supporting evidence, of those found to have violated the measures imposed by paragraph 20 of resolution 1493, and those found to have supported them in such activities.

On 21 April 2004, Kofi Annan informed the Council of the appointment of four experts to carry out these tasks.⁴ In line with the three-tiered approach, this group of experts considered information provided to it by MONUC as a springboard for some of its further investigations. Given the ten-week mandate, they opted for a case study

⁴ Annan's letter was addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2004/317). The appointed experts were: Mr. Leon-Pascal Seudie, Police expert (Cameroon), Ms. Kathi Lynn Austin, arms trafficking expert (United States of America), Mr. Victor Dupere, air navigation expert (Canada) and Mr. Jean Luc Gallet, customs expert (France). The Panel was to be assisted by a UN Political Affairs Officer.

approach and stipulated that their report be considered a foundation report, focused on a set of specific cases, rather than a comprehensive account of arms flows and related activities in the DRC.

Time constraints limited the geographic scope of the group's work. Given the proximity and alleged involvement of Rwanda and Uganda in Ituri and the Kivus, they focused on the border areas between the eastern DRC and western Rwanda and Uganda. The Group assessed 21 primary and ancillary border areas, and surveyed Lakes Albert and Kivu extensively. Further, aerial surveys were conducted in the area around Bunia, Fataki, Mahagi and Boga in Ituri and in areas surrounding Beni and Walikale in North Kivu. All assessments and surveys were backed by photographic evidence.

In accordance with its mandate, the group of experts only examined and analyzed information pertaining to suspected violations of the arms embargo after 28 July 2003. In particular, the group of experts intended to investigate the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer of arms and any related material; the encroachment of foreign government troops into the DRC; the provision of assistance, advice or training related to military activities; the unimpeded access of leaders of Congolese armed groups to neighboring countries (in particular to recruit demobilized combatants or civilians, whether forcibly or not); the passage through neighboring countries to outflank opposing troops in the DRC; the use of neighboring countries as a retreat, rear base or safe haven; and the illicit internal movement of weapons within the DRC.

During its time in the field, the Group of experts identified numerous channels through which direct and indirect assistance was being provided to armed groups operating in Ituri, the Kivus and in other parts of the DRC, both by neighboring countries and from within. This assistance included the supply of arms and ammunition. The experts therefore recommended the extension of the embargo and improvement of MONUC's monitoring and interdiction capacity by providing the mission with the appropriate maritime patrol and air surveillance capabilities, including appropriate nocturnal, satellite, radar and photographic assets. In addition, the need was identified to provide relevant MONUC personnel with specialized training, including how to monitor and track illicit air movements.

That these recommendations have not been implemented is evident from the prevailing situation in eastern DRC. Between November 2004 and the end of February 2005, there were some 50 attacks by rebel militia on local communities in the Ituri region. Nine Bangladeshi peacekeepers were killed in an ambush in February 2005. The rebels were well-trained and organized, and it was evident that they were still getting weapons from neighboring countries despite the arms embargo. The following week, MONUC forces on a cordon and search operation again came under rebel fire, and killed up to 60 militiamen in an ensuing fire fight. It was believed that these were the same faction that had ambushed the Bangladeshis, and the peacekeepers found evidence suggesting that these rebels were planning attacks on either a nearby refugee camp or on peacekeeping forces.

The UN acknowledges a huge and ongoing intelligence deficit. In a media interview on 4 March 2005, Margaret Carey (deputy head of the DPKO's Africa Division) said: "Exactly who's training them, I don't have that kind of intelligence, but we do know that they are being supplied from across borders and that there are contacts and links between them and elements in Kinshasa and in the neighboring countries."⁵ Carey added that MONUC needs air surveillance, as well as electronic warfare and listening capabilities, to monitor the arms embargo in the North and South Kivu provinces and Ituri.

INTELLIGENCE NEEDS FOR DDR

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) is a complex process, not least because of the range of human attitudes and motivations among those to be disarmed. Ex-combatants are suspicious and often susceptible to manipulation and agitation by cross-border, national, and local actors with vested economic and political interests. Former leaders are anxious about the loss of their power-base and authority, while community members who were the victims of the conflict are often polarized and vexed by the thought that the perpetrators of the violence and terror are to benefit inordinately from the DDR process.

One of the key challenges lies in the identification of exactly who should be disarmed. Over the long term, a strategy of disarmament and arms management should encompass everybody bearing arms without legal authority. However, during DDR processes, belligerents as defined in a peace agreement must be the primary focus for disarmament efforts.⁶ Community arms collection programs can later be brought into consideration in order to disarm those who were not specified in the peace agreement.

DDR processes were originally conceived for the demobilization of formal military structures or "formed units" operating within well-defined, disciplined military command structures, and normally in a situation where there is bureaucratic evidence of service.⁷ The central idea was to conduct the disarmament and demobilization through existing command structures, in order to prevent units from dispersing their arms and to retain them under command until the process was completed. Retaining command structures in

⁵ "UN peacekeeping official seeks more intelligence capability in Congo," *The Star Online* (Malaysia), 4 March 2005, <http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2005/3/4/latest/21791UNpeaceke&sec=latest>.

⁶ Because of the generalized and non-specific language of most peace agreements, this has rarely been clear until disarmament is actually underway. For example, agreements may specify that particular armed movements or factions must be disarmed, but they are not specific as to whether or not DDR includes individuals who do not actually bear arms but nevertheless play key roles in sustaining the combat capability of armed groups.

⁷ The most successful DDR processes have occurred where such units existed: Zimbabwe, South Africa, Mozambique, Angola, El Salvador.



place during the “DD” element would 1) ensure that rogue elements did not emerge, 2) ensure that no one was missed, and 3) maintain military discipline among armed elements during the critical, and often lawless, immediate post-war period. Reintegration would be a “community-based” activity, supporting ex-combatants in their home communities to re-enter civilian life, often with the assistance of veterans’ organizations.

However, these concepts and processes do not readily apply to internal conflicts in Africa, where conflict between military actors is a relatively minor component of a conflict system that is predominantly based on the violent exploitation of the wider population for economic gain. These conflicts are fought by small, loosely organized armed groups operating according to their own rules and living off the land. Bureaucratic records of either units or combatant service are rare, and during DDR the lack of formal structures offers a distinct opportunity to the commanders of such forces. It enables them to present personnel registers that can manipulate the process by avoiding the demobilization of core combatant groups and hijacking demobilization resources to distribute as patronage to potential supporter groups.⁸ As David Keen noted in Sierra Leone during the UN’s first attempt at DDR in 1999: “Many observers

⁸ James Fennel, background paper for the ISS/KAIPCTC workshop “Identifying Lessons from DDR Experiences in Africa,” Accra, 10-12 August 2004. Fennel is the UK Regional Conflict Prevention Advisor for West Africa.

felt that those who had disarmed were mostly the abductees and those charged with portering work rather than hard core combatants”⁹

The lack of accurate data for numbers of combatants is a constant problem. Armed groups may not declare the number of combatants under their command, and it is easy for the number of individuals registering for reintegration benefits during disarmament and demobilization to mushroom. The lack of accurate data also complicates the collection of arms and ammunition, as up to six people may claim to share one weapon, simply to benefit from the DDR program. Military Observers have therefore had to improvise tests in the field, in an attempt to screen those presenting themselves as combatants — for example, stripping a weapon to show competency.¹⁰

Excluded groups and individuals can be spoilers of the peace process, raising insecurity among parties to the peace agreement and stalling activities — as has happened in the Great Lakes and West African region, where former combatants in one war have increased regional destabilization by simply joining another war rather than participating in DDR processes. A good test of whether DDR is focused on the real combatants, or has been harnessed to distribute political patronage, is to compare the wartime estimates of military strength with the number of combatants that enroll in the DDR process. The number of “hard core” combatants engaged in Liberia’s conflict from 1999-2003 was relatively small, in all probability around 10,000 fighters.¹¹ However, in early 2004, UNMIL came up with an initial planning figure for a DDRR (Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration) process that would accommodate 38,000 combatants—a high estimate that was constantly revised

⁹ David Keen, *Sierra Leone’s War in a Regional Context*, Human Security Report (London: Centre for the Study of Global Governance-LSE, 2002).

¹⁰ In Sierra Leone, this sometimes had perverse consequences. Where UNAMSIL improvised tests such as stripping and assembling rifles, local “entrepreneurs” soon set up training classes to teach non-combatants these basic skills, so that they could qualify for DDR. New ideas for simple but effective testing therefore need to be considered.

¹¹ It is evident that the Liberian DDR process, failed this test. The Liberian Post reported in 2002 that while LURD commanders uniformly claimed around 14,000-15,000 combatants, this was likely to include carriers, spies and other unarmed members. Based on the numbers known to travel to Lofa from other parts of the region, the figure was probably closer to 2,000-3,000 real combatants operating in Liberia. See www.liberia.tripod.com, an internet site closely linked to LURD. A detailed RIIA investigation into LURD during February 2003 similarly found that LURD’s total number of men under arms numbered around 2,500 to 3,000 with an additional 500 or so unarmed logistical assistants. James Brabazon, *Liberia: Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy* (LURD), Royal Institute for International Affairs, February 2003. On the other hand, the International Crisis Group estimated in November 2003 that the total number of forces loyal to Charles Taylor was between 7-11,000 (including some former RUF fighters), and that MODEL numbered around 1,000 fighters. See *Liberia: Security Challenges*, ICG, Brussels, 11/2003.

upward in response to pressure from the warring factions through NCDDRR.¹² A total of 102,990 “combatants” were eventually “disarmed” and demobilized. It is clear that the NCDDRR estimates were not verified at the outset and during the various phases of the process by UNMIL.

The challenge of combatant identification remains the principal intelligence gap in DDR processes. If missions continue to rely on lists generated by the commanders of the armed groups, there will always be a high risk of great disparities between the number of weapons surrendered and the number of registered ex-combatants.¹³ Bureaucratic evidence must be replaced by intelligence that enables verification of commanders and their lists before DDR is initiated, to ensure that factions are not using DDR to disburse political patronage, and to be certain that demobilization is focused on hard core combatants.¹⁴

DDR in Liberia

- Total number of forces loyal to Charles Taylor was between 7 -11,000
- LURD’s total number of men under arms numbers around 2,500 to 3,000
- MODEL numbered around 1,000 fighters
- 102,990 ‘combatants’ were ‘disarmed’ and demobilized by January 2005
- 26,000 small arms and light weapons (SA/LW) were collected from this caseload.

¹²National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization Rehabilitation and Reintegration (composed of representatives from the factions, the NTGL, ECOWAS and UNMIL)

¹³See Sarah Meek and Mark Malan (eds) *Identifying Lessons from DDR Experiences in Africa*, ISS Monograph No. 106, October 2004.

¹⁴James Fennel, background paper for the ISS/KAIPTC workshop “Identifying Lessons from DDR Experiences in Africa.”



INTEL NEEDS IN DDR

- Originally for the demob of 'formed units' within well defined military command structures, with bureaucratic evidence of service
- Concepts and processes do not readily apply where conflict between military is a relatively minor component of a conflict based on violent exploitation of the wider population
- "Those who had disarmed were mostly the abductees and those charged with portering work rather than hard core combatants" (David Keen:

Sierra Leone's War)

DDR

- Lack of accurate data for numbers of combatants
- Complicates collection of arms and ammunition
- Wartime estimates of military strength compared with the numbers that enrol in the DDR process - lack of relevant information available to the mission

Deficit ...

- Combatant identification remains the principle intelligence gap in DDR processes - lists generated by the commanders of armed groups are not good enough
- 'Bureaucratic' evidence must be replaced by intelligence that enables verification of commanders and their 'lists'

MILITARY OBSERVERS

The nature of peace operations is to have heavy involvement with the populace, governments, police, and military factions, which makes intelligence collection HUMINT-intensive. Human intelligence will often remain the only source of reliable information about the situation. While factual and impartial reporting constitutes the cornerstone of successful peace operations, the reality is that most contingents in UN or regional operations in Africa do not have soldiers that are very skilled at reporting.

The value in deploying numerous HUMINT teams in an area of operations is fairly evident; however, UN missions in Africa currently rely almost exclusively on Military Observers (MilObs) for operational and tactical military information gathering, and on Military Information Officers (MIO) for the processing thereof. Military Information in PSO is essentially intelligence gathering by another name. A UN MIO collates the information contained in reports from MilObs and analyzes it to identify the details that would provide a distinct perspective covering the larger “mission” picture. Reports need to be timely and succinct and provide a local interpretation of “facts.”

Much of the organic intelligence capability provided by MilObs at the sector level satisfies the tactical “force protection” requirement of the contingents, and seldom provides an intelligence capability for senior mission management as a whole. Moreover, information tends to flow haphazardly to military operations staff and other departments according to who gathers it or who wants to be first to break it. In some cases, uncorroborated information is passed upward as fact and embarrassment can be the result. Other examples are of information not being passed at all, which is more damaging. Although the mission HQ may be well placed to interpret the wider context, the sectors normally have better local feel and no reports should be forwarded without some degree of initial assessment from the Sector HQ staff.¹⁵ There is a marked tendency to serve up raw information without any accompanying filter or commentary.

A significant factor that adversely affects the nature and quality of information being passed to Mission HQ is the need for back-questioning to confirm details — something which occurs far too often. Much of the information derived in the field comes from one-off meetings that may be difficult to reprise. To reduce this inefficiency, more comprehensive and standardized formats for observation reports, violation complaints and debriefings would serve well. Equally important is that there should be proper evidence gathered for complaints (essentially witness statements) that record formally the nature of the incident. Sometimes, complaints are delivered verbally and repeated as hearsay in MilObs reports, which satisfies neither the proper recording of the incident, nor the individual making the complaint.¹⁶

It should perhaps not be surprising that the content of reports has not always been digested by higher headquarters, analysis has not always been accepted, and national

¹⁵ UN DPKO, JMAC (Joint Mission Analysis Cell) SOP 1/05, 31 January 2005, Annex A.

¹⁶ UN DPKO, JMAC SOP 1/05, 31 January 2005, Annex A.

interests have been placed above the need for objectivity. Inadequate understanding of the MilObs role, and an inability to structure and report clearly, means that reports are sometimes little more than travel diaries. It has also been found that as areas of responsibility (AORs) become more benign, the motivation for MilObs to produce accurate and insightful reports tends to diminish. Patrols often fail to venture beyond bland and easily extracted information on health and general living conditions.¹⁷

Indeed, reviews indicate that there is general tendency in missions to gather information for its own sake, passing it on randomly no matter what the relevance. It has therefore been recommended by DPKO that a document be produced that defines Mission Information Requirements (MIR). This document should be disseminated as a directive to Sector HQs. It should be accompanied by a requirement for Sector HQs to supplement it with their own documents, Sector Information Requirements (SIR). The MIR should be reviewed periodically, to establish what information requirements have been met, what needs to be refined and what new requirements should be added. A supplementary list of Priority Information Requirements (PIR) should be published fortnightly.¹⁸

The UN Department of Peace-Keeping Operations (DPKO) Training and Evaluation Service has made some progress in determining selection criteria and training guidelines for MilObs, in consultation with member states and a variety of national peacekeeping training centres. However, the current UN Military Observers Handbook¹⁹ pays scant attention to information collection, evaluation, analysis and reporting skills. It consists of nine chapters, which cover the basics of serving in a UN mission— a “Peacekeeping 101”-type syllabus. In short, nothing really prepares Military Observers for their unique responsibility as the eyes and ears of the mission.

¹⁷Interviews with a KAIPTC staff member, October 2004. The individual concerned, who wishes to remain anonymous, served as a UN Military Observer with the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) during the latter part of 2000.

¹⁸UN DPKO, JMAC SOP 1/05, 31 January 2005, Annex A.

¹⁹UN DPKO, United Nations Military Observers Handbook, Second Draft, July 2001.

MEETING OPERATIONAL INTEL REQUIREMENTS

- HUMINT-intensive
- MilObs for operational and tactical level information gathering
- Military Information Officers (MIO) for the processing thereof
- Content of reports not always digested by higher formations
- Analysis not always accepted
- Inability to structure and report clearly - sometimes little more than travel diaries.

(OIOS report A/59/764, 1 April 2005)

Typical Tasks

- Compiling profiles of key players;
- Analysing political developments;
- Establishing contacts with parties to conflict at all levels;
- Developing strategies to achieve or implement peace agreements;
- Working with diplomats to use leverage of Member States;
- Developing DDR programmes with military colleagues and humanitarian and development organizations;
- Providing policy advice to government officials, including the development of roadmaps for political progress;
- Conceptualizing, planning and establishing new political institutions under a transitional administration mandate; and
- Interacting with donors to mobilize resources for peace negotiations or peace-building activities.

POLITICAL AFFAIRS OFFICERS AND PANELS OF EXPERTS

Political affairs officers are expected to understand the dynamics of the armed conflict that created the requirement for a peacekeeping operation, to follow closely the evolution of these dynamics and to develop strategies to help the parties in conflict resolve disputes through peaceful means. Regardless of the size or scope of the operation, political affairs officers are required to keep sight of the larger national and international political context. They are supposed to be capable of dissecting whose interests are served by the perpetuation of the conflict and, within the confines of the mandate, of devising innovative solutions for changing the underlying dynamics. The job typically includes the following tasks, under the overall direction of the Head of Mission:

- Compiling profiles of key players in a conflict or peace process;
- Analyzing political developments;
- Establishing contacts with parties to the conflict at all levels;
- Developing strategies to achieve or implement peace agreements;
- Working with diplomats to use the leverage of Member States;
- Developing disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs with military colleagues and humanitarian and development organizations;
- Providing policy advice to government officials, including the development of roadmaps for political progress;
- Conceptualizing, planning and establishing new political institutions under a transitional administration mandate; and
- Interacting with donors to mobilize resources for peace negotiations or peace-building activities.

The profiles of political affairs officers have become as varied as the tasks they are expected to undertake. An academic grounding in political science or international relations, as well as knowledge of the country or region, is often preferred. The main requirements are versatility and an ability to analyze and communicate clearly.²⁰ At least one senior serving political affairs officer is of the opinion that such competencies cannot be taught in a course of instruction:

²⁰Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations, Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, December 2003.

For me, political analysis (a bit like creative writing) is something that is not really—cannot really—be taught (despite the proliferation of creative writing courses). It is something that one picks up from reading and discussing history, politics, local conditions etc. ... I have always been very sceptical of my colleagues who think they are very important because they do “political work,” and only they are in a position to make political points, unlike those poor souls who are not “political officers” and therefore haven’t a clue. In my experience, military, human rights and humanitarian officers are just as likely to have a feel for the political reality as political affairs officers.²¹

On the other hand, according to the UN DPKO draft training strategy: “Today’s skills will not be enough for tomorrow’s tasks—and no teams/units or individuals come complete with all the knowledge, skills and abilities they need to be successful in a UN environment. There are always gaps or areas that need reinforcement.”²² Perhaps the UN expects too much of its political affairs officers, or perhaps it is unable to attract and retain the required quantity and quality of officers to execute the numerous and complex tasks enumerated above. Whatever the reason, it is apparent that the UN cannot depend upon the political affairs components of its missions in Africa to monitor embargoes and provide economic intelligence, and therefore has to rely on the appointment of *ad hoc* “panels of experts” for these tasks.

For example, on 17 May 2005, the Secretary-General named another five-member panel of experts to monitor the extended arms embargo against the DRC.²³ Similarly, on 1 April 2005, in response to a Security Council request, Kofi Annan appointed a three-member panel of experts to monitor the arms embargo on Côte d’Ivoire.²⁴ Their duties include examining and analyzing information gathered by the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) and French Licorne forces, information from other governments on any flows of arms and related materiel and any provision of military aid, advice or training, as well as any networks operating in violation of the embargo.

In Liberia, a five-member UN panel of experts was appointed to monitor the four-year-old ban on diamond exports by Liberia. The panel reported to the Security Council in March 2005 that the National Transitional Government of Liberia had signed a secret

²¹ Interview with a UN Senior Political Advisor who wishes to remain anonymous, 18 April 2005.

²² UN DPKO, Draft Training Strategy, February 2005, Introduction.

²³ The members of the panel are: Ibra Deguène Ka, from Senegal (chairman); Kathi Lynn Austin from the USA (arms trafficking expert); Abdoulaye Cissoko from Mali (aviation expert); and Jean Luc Gallet from France (customs and border control expert).

²⁴ The Council imposed the embargo in November 2005. The members are Gilbert Charles Barthe of Switzerland, Atabou Bodian of Senegal (chairman), and Alex Vines of the United Kingdom.

agreement with the West African Mining Corporation (WAMCO), a deal that gives a *de facto* monopoly to WAMCO to buy up Liberian diamonds and other minerals produced in the west of the country. The panel expressed concern that the deal was struck in an atmosphere of secrecy with a company of “unknown provenance” and cited its existence as evidence that the ban on diamond exports should be maintained.²⁵

The tasks handed to these panels of experts are arguably in the purview of the political affairs sections of MONUC, ONUCI, UNMIL and the like. However, it appears that *ad hoc* panels of experts—many of them researchers working with international “think tanks”—are more adept at “data mining,” and that they have the expertise needed to analyze this information and to produce reports to aid decisions at the highest level. The UN Secretary-General sees the establishment of “joint mission analysis cells” in missions such as ONUCI as essential for arms embargo monitoring processes, but this will only be so if the cells are fully established and fully functional (see below).²⁶

At mission HQ level, coordinating the availability and analysis of available information from all role players has long been a challenge. UN missions direct a complex mixture of political, military and humanitarian elements—each with their own sources of information, analytical process and operational objectives, and their related intelligence requirements and planning cycles. Failure to establish an integrated mechanism to handle this information has resulted in different components each having their own view of a given situation, and in advice being provided to senior mission management that is often contradictory or confused.²⁷

While military G-2 practices offer tried and trusted methods of information management, the UN DPKO considers the most appropriate solution in the multi-disciplinary PSO environment would be to create a joint or integrated structure staffed with military and civilian analysts. For this reason, DPKO has elaborated a concept for the centralized direction, collection, processing and dissemination of information, and has begun to establish Joint Mission Analysis Cells (JMAC) in a few of its ongoing missions.

²⁵The ban was originally imposed in 2001, along with an arms embargo, to prevent the government of former President Charles Taylor from using the foreign exchange earned from diamonds mined in Liberia and smuggled in from neighboring Sierra Leone to buy weapons. The UN Security Council extended its ban on exports of rough diamonds by Liberia in December 2004 for a further six months, with an undertaking to review the situation in March 2005. After receiving the report of the panel, it agreed on 30 March 2005 to keep the ban in force until June when it will come up for review again. See IRIN, UN reveals suspect diamond deal, 30 March 2005.

²⁶United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on inter-mission cooperation and possible cross-border operations between the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, the United Nations Mission in Liberia and the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, S/2005/135, 2 March 2005, par. 11.

²⁷Patrick Cammaert.

THE JMAC CONCEPT

The role and intent of the JMAC is *to provide the expertise to handle information, conduct and present analysis, build databases, and provide advice at a level that will ensure that decisions are made with awareness of all available and relevant factors*. The cell should be capable of providing in-depth current assessments and longer-term analyses of issues affecting the mission. The JMAC will draw on information available from open sources but it will also assess the information gathered by all elements of the mission. Humanitarian representatives will be one of the key players in providing information. Others, such as security, civilian police, military and political officers, will also contribute. The JMAC will be the focal point for the fusion of information from all sources. The strategic intent of the JMAC is to harness information from multiple sources and services to create actionable information and intelligence to deter and defeat threats posed by armed groups and other spoilers within the area of operations.

The JMAC is thus conceived as a multidisciplinary cell that undertakes analysis of information from all sources and provides medium- and long-term intelligence advice to senior mission management. Embedded in the organization would be a Central Information Management Cell (IMC), jointly military and civilian, to provide a focus for reports and ensure the free passage of information around the Mission and Force HQs.

Information arrives at mission headquarters by various means: e-mail direct, fax, code cable or through first-hand reports from the Operations Room. E-mails may be limited distribution or, more commonly, be scattered randomly to every possible recipient, many of whom find it irksome. In the JMAC concept, a Standard Operating Procedure would specify the process of directing all reports, from both military and civilian sources, to the IMC. A small number of Information Managers in the IMC would be responsible for initial screening, prioritization, first-line analysis and reporting. It would be their responsibility to disseminate the information as necessary, tasking the appropriate analyst with the further exploitation of the material. IMC officers may also be tasked to conduct focused research. The analysis component of the JMAC will provide comprehensive analysis encompassing all the dimensions of a mission ranging from political and risk management, to humanitarian and military areas. This analysis will provide the medium- to longer-term, strategic perspective that will enable the mission to spot trends and anticipate developments.

Most missions to date have not had a comprehensive information database. While the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC) has a database, it is located in Military Information and it is non-relational, which means that researchers have to scroll through endless reports to gather information. Much time is wasted in looking for archived information by hunting through past e-mails. There can be no adequate grasp of information, personalities, events or activities, without a database with all headquarters divisions joined to it, where people can pool knowledge and commonly share what is hidden on individual computers. The collation of information into a dependable, common, relational database is therefore considered a vital tool for the JMAC, where all information will be entered and over time an extensive wealth of knowledge assembled. The database will include


information on personalities, events, incidents, groups and other information required by the mission. Information entered into the database would obviously require careful vetting for accuracy and reliability.

To ensure security of information, the JMAC will work within a discrete Local area Network (LAN), with the ability to join the UN Wide Area Network (WAN) for dissemination of its product. The information contained on the database as well as assessments in progress will be sensitive and therefore the dissemination of product will be the responsibility of the Chief of JMAC. Measures will be necessary to ensure the operational security and preserve the sensitivity of the JMAC.

The JMAC should be headed by a Senior Information Analyst (D-1 level, depending on the size of the mission) who coordinates and directs the production of short- and longer-term analytical papers, written and verbal briefings, estimates, threat and risk assessments and other research projects directed by the Senior Management Team. The JMAC Head and Deputy will have experience at the strategic and operational level in intelligence staff work and a strong analytical background. Similarly, military and civilian analysts, including a risk management analyst, must have skills and experience in producing or contributing to the range of intelligence products. The size of the JMAC will be linked directly to the size and scale of the mission.

A range of traditional intelligence tools will be used to direct the efforts of the JMAC. The overarching document is the Collection Plan which will define the collection effort of the UN sources and agencies. Gaps in information will be identified and potential sources will be assigned to meet particular requirements. The JMAC will have the authority to seek information and tasks will be levied on all components of the UN mission in the field to provide information. In return, the analysis will be shared with the components, agencies and programs and in particular threat and risk assessments will be provided. Collection Plans will also be developed at levels below Mission Headquarters so that information can be gathered, for example, from regional offices where often more detailed and in-depth knowledge is available. More specifically, Priority Information Requirements will be distributed at all levels so that subordinate headquarters will have guidance in seeking the information required by the JMAC. To supplement this process, more urgent Requests for Information (RFI) can be brought to the IMC at any time.

The JMAC should be in operation 24 hours a day, which would considerably increase over current practices the capability to absorb and analyze information. The centrality of the JMAC to the mission structure is illustrated schematically below:



In summary, the tasks the JMAC will perform are to:

- Provide relevant and timely analysis and advice to the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG), Senior Management team and heads of office, components and agencies within a mission to allow informed decision-making.
- Monitor and provide early warning of development of threats.
- Establish a focal point for all information.
- Collect information and create a database to ensure continuity.
- Provide short-term and longer-term assessments of events and developments in response to tasking and requests from the SRSG and other mission components.
- Provide input into threat and risk analysis and advice on the mitigation of risk in close coordination with the security components.
- Produce integrated written and verbal evaluations and distribute these as appropriate.
- Liaise with neighboring missions to ensure the coordination and sharing of relevant information

- Co-ordinate meetings and working groups to encourage the input of information of all mission components, offices, agencies and programs to ensure as comprehensive a security assessment as possible.
- Integrate with security components on the production of threat estimates and analysis.

The fact that the JMAC will cover the main functional areas of a mission does not mean that all components have to be represented in the JMAC. But it does mean that for each functional component there should be an expert who is the point of contact for that component. Although the JMAC's primary focus is medium to longer term, those who coordinate current operations will also be able to draw on its resources.²⁸

A further innovation by DPKO has been the development of a concept for creating Security Information and Operations Cells (SIOC) in UN missions. The SIOC will be both a contributor to the JMAC (from security personnel at all levels) and a user of JMAC databases or finished product to assist in SIOC threat assessments. This practice will avoid duplication of material collected and achieve efficiency by ensuring that all relevant information is available to JMAC analysts responsible for a broader security assessment.

The SIOC concept is still in its infancy and has not yet been established in existing missions. It is envisaged that the SIOC's responsibilities will relate to security issues only, whereas the JMAC's are much wider. There will inevitably be an overlap of interests, but the aim is to avoid competition or duplication of functions—something the missions cannot afford. Ultimately, the JMAC should be the custodian of the information and intelligence database covering the whole range of mission interests, while the SIOC should work closely with the JMAC and be able to draw on its database to inform its own decision-making process. However, the SIOC should not be conducting a separate analysis process in anything other than very specific security-focused issues.²⁹

Close coordination between the SIOC and JMAC is essential; however, DPKO has emphasized to Member States that JMAC is not a military intelligence cell. Although it will provide information for current operations, it does not have responsibility for operational coordination; this is the job of the Joint Operations Cell (JOC). JMAC is also not in competition with other functional areas with an interest in information management; it is simply the single integrated mechanism for producing a comprehensive product.³⁰

To further illustrate the JMAC role, risk analysis graphics will be provided by the JMAC to reflect a current assessment of risk to personnel operating in all Mission areas. The information will be displayed graphically to facilitate briefing and decision-making

²⁸UN DPKO (Military Division and Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit), *The Joint Mission Analysis Cell (JMAC)*, briefing to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping (C34), 2 February 2005.

²⁹Interview with Nicholas Seymour, 31 March 2005. Colonel Seymour is Chief of the Military Planning Service at UN DPKO.

³⁰UNDPKO, *The Joint Mission Analysis Cell (JMAC)*, Briefing to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping, 2 February 2005.

on such matters as the deployment of staff into isolated areas in the field. Incidents involving criminal, military or armed group activity, or situations of concern to, for example, Human Rights or Child Protection staff will also be recorded and collated. The integrated nature of the JMAC will encourage the contribution of all components of the mission to improve situation awareness and make recommendations on measures to mitigate risk or threat to potentially exposed UN staff, offices, agencies and components.

The key to the success of the JMAC concept is the availability of professional intelligence analysts with strategic and operational experience to head the JMAC. While a civilian chief will provide continuity, military personnel in JMAC must also have an intelligence background. The analytic process and quality of intelligence product is also dependent on the information available at the tactical level, where some contingents are strong in technological intelligence-gathering capability, and others in low tech, on-the-ground HUMINT ability—gained through experience in operating in similar environments or peacekeeping missions.

IMPLEMENTATION OF JMAC: THE UNMIL EXPERIENCE³¹

The JMAC concept is sound in theory, but it is nowhere near to being fully implemented in practice. One of the key problems with implementation in Liberia is that the mission is not structured, nor does it have the procedures or the mindset to fully support the JMAC. Nonetheless, some aspects are starting to work, such as the incorporation of civilian analysts.

The requisite “buy in” from the various mission components has not yet occurred. There is not insubstantial resistance to the JMAC concept on the ground at middle and senior management level. The reasons for this vary from a lack of understanding of the concept, to a built-in resistance to what is commonly thought of as a “military” organization, to basic turf issues as various organizations protect their spheres of responsibility. In Liberia, JMAC premises are located some 15 kilometers from Mission HQ, but only 10 meters from the Force Commander’s office. The symbolism of the JMAC’s location is huge. Inevitably, this co-location will further the idea that the JMAC is a military organization. It is therefore important that the location of the JMAC be carefully considered, as it becomes an integrated component of current and future PSOs.

Erratic passage of information and “guarding” of information is still a common occurrence. Under such circumstances, a JMAC cannot in fact work as it should. Overcoming this obstacle will require:

- An endorsed policy outlining the JMAC’s mission, status and *modus operandi*. This should include clear direction on chains of command, control and commu-

³¹ Interview with Colonel Louise Felton, UNMIL Chief JMAC, 30 May 2005. For UNMIL, it was recommended that an experienced military officer (Colonel) head the JMAC for a year, but, for the sake of continuity, a civilian (P5), could head the cell in subsequent phases.

nication, and detail on how the other organizations fit in. This is essential to ensure common understanding.

- Once policy is in place, personnel attached to the JMAC, such as Civil Affairs analysts, need to have their terms of reference, contractual obligations and funding lines clearly defined. This is required not only to avoid the “resentment” of organizations who have to give up members of staff to work in the JMAC, but also so that staff do not find themselves in the ambiguous position of “belonging” contractually to one organization but working for another and possibly being seen as traitors in the camp.³²

Without the whole concept of JMAC being officially endorsed, and proper terms of reference agreed for those attached to it, there will remain considerable difficulty in trying to get the system to work, and those attached to the JMAC will remain in a delicate and difficult professional situation. The expansion of the JMAC to include staff from the main areas of the mission is clearly key to the concept, but this is also where the most resistance has been encountered.

Another major challenge facing the JMAC is the lack of appropriately trained personnel. With one or two exceptions, JMAC personnel are not trained comprehensively in the field of intelligence. Nor in many cases do they have experience in simply collecting, collating and analyzing information and producing reports. These skills are not so difficult to acquire over time, provided that personnel have a good command of English, and are intelligent with the right mindset. However, in Liberia there is a high level of turnover of personnel, which means that the JMAC is always operating at a lower level of expertise than would be desirable, and is always busy with a fair amount of on-the-job training. This is manageable most of the time, but when the operational tempo increases, it can put considerable pressure on the few experienced personnel in the organization. Thus, *the provision of appropriately trained personnel, both civilian and military, is essential if the JMAC concept is to work effectively.*

The proper operation of a JMAC involves not only personnel provision, but also personnel retention. It is difficult for any system as complex as JMAC to operate effectively without some degree of long-term or corporate memory. The UNMIL JMAC has suffered from a lack of continuity. The production of good analysis and informed comment relies on personnel with historical background knowledge and knowledge of the current issues in the mission area. A good database is of considerable help, but this in turn depends on having enough suitably knowledgeable, skilled and trained people to keep the database up to date.

The UNMIL JMAC has suffered from gaps in the staffing of key posts, such as Information Managers,³³ and this leads to gaps in data because people do not physically have the time to regularly update the information. In order to ensure the comprehensive and

³² For example, a civil affairs officer posted in the JMAC was unable to obtain information from his Civil Affairs counterparts because he was regarded as a representative of the military arm of the mission. Interview with UNMIL civil affairs officer, 11 June 2005.

accurate storage and cataloguing of information, a dedicated database manager is an essential requirement for the JMAC. Moreover, formalizing the appointment of civilian analysts as part of the JMAC team will help in improving corporate memory and experience, as civilians tend to remain in the mission for a considerably longer period than their military counterparts. Civilian analysts also add substantial value to the information product, because of their different and often broader range of experiences, knowledge and contacts.

CONCLUSION

There has always been a tradition within the UN system that intelligence gathering is contrary to the open nature of the UN system and is therefore absolutely forbidden. Intelligence has not been considered necessary for traditional operations, where the consent of all parties involved was a leading principle. However, after-action studies show an increasing concern among military and civilian personnel that the direction, processing, and dissemination of information relating to the mission are often inadequate. Uncoordinated and contradictory information stemming from a multitude of unrelated sources flows haphazardly into military and civilian departments of the mission, conditioned by who happens to collect it. As a consequence, unverified information is pushed upward, applied in policy planning and publicized. Apart from the possible waste of time and resources to pursue the wrong policy objectives, this may compromise the credibility of the mission as a whole.

Fortunately, it appears that the taboo has been broken (at least within DPKO, if not among all Member States and personnel in the field) and the UN can now speak about intelligence. Some Member States have finally concluded that the nature of conflict has changed. The challenge now is to develop the structures, strategies and specialized personnel to handle information analysis. One solution to this problem is to create an integrated, multidisciplinary structure of military and civilian analysts, a body that currently goes under the name of the Joint Mission Analysis Cell (JMAC). The JMAC concept has been presented to the General Assembly's Special Committee on Peacekeeping (C-34) for consideration, where it was well received, but not approved as such. Moreover, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions has hindered the implementation of JMAC because it has not seen the usefulness of nor approved the budget for civilian members of JMAC staff. This means that civilian members of the staff currently have to be seconded from other mission components such as Political Affairs, Civil Affairs or Human Rights.

Nevertheless, the JMAC concept has been established (albeit on an *ad hoc* basis) in several ongoing UN missions. For example, in Sudan there is a Unified Mission Analysis Cell (UMAC), and the missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone both have cells known as JMAC. None of these cells in fact works as they should, but the DPKO has established a

³³ According to the staffing table, the UNMIL JMAC should have three Information Managers, but it started up and ran for months with only one on post.

working group to deal with the challenges of implementation. The group consists of members of the Best Practices Unit, Military Planning Service, Civilian Police Division, UN Security, and OCHA (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs). The working group is in the process of developing an official JMAC policy, and should have a first draft on the table by 15 July 2005. After a process of refinement, the draft will be presented to the DPKO Senior Management Team at the end of July 2005.

At the field level, sharing highly sensitive information may add a new dimension to the challenges of cooperation among the various components of today's integrated missions. The JMAC brief, to collect intelligence from all sources, civilian as well as military, may further fuel turf wars and tendencies toward "tribalism" in the missions. A dedicated information/education campaign will be necessary to deal with lack of knowledge of the concept and the benefits of more coordinated information gathering and processing. The need for a clear identification of the JMAC mandate, articulation of a policy, and subsequent mission-wide training is indicated.



Mr. Kent Brokenshire, a U.S. Department of State official with prior diplomatic postings to Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo, joined Mr. Malan in a panel discussion with the Fellows about peace-keeping operations in Africa

No matter what new structures are created, their efficacy will be dependent in no small measure on the knowledge and skills of key individuals operating within the system. On the military side, much of the extant organic intelligence capability in the missions is designed only to satisfy the tactical "force protection" requirement of the contingents, and seldom provides the scope and quality of intelligence required by decision-makers in a dynamic and integrated mission environment. At the lowest military tactical levels, there is little doubt that the capability may be enhanced by appropriate training and


the provision of basic equipment such as digital cameras. Troop-contributing countries also might be encouraged to provide dedicated intelligence assets to their contingent HQs, including professional intelligence officers, linguists and analysts who have a satisfactory understanding of the conflict area.

While JMAC personnel in the field welcome the fact that the word "intelligence" is now being used freely, they are also concerned about the expectations that this creates in a situation where JMACs are not yet in a position (appropriately structured, trained, and equipped) to produce true *intelligence*. The JMACs clearly need a lot more institutional authority and support to deliver the full capability envisioned for a "joint mission analysis cell."

GEOSPATIAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO HUMANITARIAN CRISES

Ms. Paula J. Roberts, Executive Business Director
Mr. Jim Goslee, Imagery Analyst
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency

Ms. Paula J. Roberts and Mr. Jim Goslee from the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) provided a briefing on geospatial-intelligence support to humanitarian crises. As a case study on this topic, they highlighted the challenges, opportunities, and the role of geospatial-intelligence support to the humanitarian crisis in the Darfur region of Sudan during 2004. Ms. Roberts and Mr. Goslee pointed out that geospatial-intelligence can provide vital information about humanitarian crises resulting from natural disasters, drought, famine, ethnic conflict, and insurgencies occurring in remote and largely inaccessible regions. They also highlighted that geospatial-intelligence products alerted policymakers about the size and scope of the crisis in Sudan so that they could mobilize international donor assistance and facilitate humanitarian relief and stability operations to alleviate the suffering of the people in the Darfur region.





Note: All slides in this briefing are unclassified.

THE DARFUR CRISIS, 2004

CHALLENGES


- REMOTE, LARGELY INACCESSIBLE REGION
- ETHNIC CONFLICT AND INSURGENCY
- THOUSANDS OF DISPLACED CIVILIANS
- POTENTIAL HUMANITARIAN DISASTER




ROLE OF GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE

- ALERTED POLICY MAKERS
- DEFINED SCOPE & SCALE OF CRISIS
- FACILITATED PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
- MITIGATED POTENTIAL CALAMITY

Know the Earth...Show the Way




Major Ethnic Groups in Sudan



Know the Earth...Show the Way

DARFURIAN VILLAGE




Know the Earth...Show the Way

VILLAGES RAZED IN DARFUR AREA, SUDAN

APRIL 2004



Know the Earth...Show the Way



Know the Earth...Show the Way



Know the Earth...Show the Way

VILLAGE RAZED IN SHATTAY, SUDAN

HOUSES INTACT:
JANUARY 2004



HOUSES RAZED:
MARCH 2004




Know the Earth...Show the Way

DESTROYED VILLAGE




Know the Earth...Show the Way



Know the Earth...Show the Way

Concentrations of Displaced Persons and NGOs, Mar 2005



Know the Earth...Show the Way

KALMA INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS CAMP OVERVIEW, SUDAN


JULY 2004



NEW NGO CONSTRUCTION
FROM MIDDLE OF JUNE
TO BEGINNING OF JULY

NGO AREA

AREA OF EXPANSION
SINCE BEGINNING OF JULY



AREA OF EXPANSION
SINCE BEGINNING OF JULY

AID DISTRIBUTION

NEW NGO CONSTRUCTION
SINCE MIDDLE OF JULY

Know the Earth...Show the Way

KUTUM INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS CAMP, SUDAN


JULY 2004




NGO AREA

NGO AREA

EXPANDED BETWEEN
BEGINNING OF MAY AND MID-JULY



Know the Earth...Show the Way



Know the Earth...Show the Way

THE UNIQUE ROLE OF GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE

- PROVIDED EARLY WARNING TO POLICY MAKERS
- DEFINED SCOPE & SCALE OF CRISIS
- FACILITATED PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
- MOBILIZED INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO PROVIDE RELIEF
- FACILITATED RELIEF/STABILITY OPERATIONS

**THE NET EFFECT OF GEOSPATIAL INTELLIGENCE:
A GREATER HUMANITARIAN DISASTER AVERTED
TENS OF THOUSANDS OF LIVES SAVED**

Know the Earth...Show the Way

PART II

PROSPECTS FOR MULTINATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION IN AFRICA

The Fellows were divided into three groups of equal size, with membership randomly determined, to brainstorm ideas with respect to international intelligence cooperation in Africa. The groups worked in physically separated spaces under some time pressure. One group was asked to consider potential opportunities for enhancing cooperation. The second group was asked to examine potential impediments to cooperation. The third group was asked to characterize cooperation now and into the future out to 2015. Each group was then asked to rank the impediments or opportunities and discuss their findings in a plenary session. The comments presented below were distilled from a record of these activities, and are set forth on a non-attribution basis.



Small Group Exercise

 **Group 1: Opportunities for Cooperation**

 **Group 2: Impediments to Cooperation**

 **Group 3: Characterizing Cooperation
Now/Future**

GROUP 1: OPPORTUNITIES FOR COOPERATION

This group's strategy was to begin its session by brainstorming various ideas. The concepts and ideas were recorded on a white board for everyone to review. No value judgment on the merit of the ideas was made during this time. Instead, the purpose was to capture as many different ideas as possible. After the group accumulated ideas, the facilitator guided a discussion among participants. Here, the thought process behind the vari-


ous suggestions was debated. The goal was to eliminate or retain each suggestion. The following concepts were retained:

Information Sharing is a Necessity

The group overwhelmingly and unanimously agreed that information sharing is increasingly required to mitigate the wide array of challenges to regional stability, security, and development in Africa. However, this requires the establishment of regional information sharing networks, processes, and resources.

Identifying Security Issues of Mutual Concern in Africa

The group then identified and ranked in priority order five core security areas for Africa for which Information sharing is required:



ESTABLISH REGIONAL INFORMATION SHARING

- **Use information to solve following issues**
 - **Conflict**
 - **Resource Protection**
 - **Medical**
 - **Small Arms/ Light weapons**
 - **Drugs**

Next, the group examined each of the core security areas individually in order to identify specific issue areas and categories of information that could be addressed through multilateral intelligence cooperation in Africa.

Conflict Issues and Causes Seen as Common Threats

The opportunities group presented their findings to a collective gathering of Fellows. The Fellows in this group believed that the biggest potential for cooperation comes from a perception of common threats associated with seven issues related to the core security area of “conflict.” The seven conflict issues include terrorism, crime, ethnic and religious disputes, and border, land, and natural resource security issues. Because of these perceived common threats, common missions and goals emerge. It is this commonality that the Fellows wish to leverage in order to obtain further collaboration among African countries. A key to the problem then becomes identifying root causes, as well as the effects, of conflicts that affect countries and regions in Africa. The Fellows advised that pervasive poverty, lack of economic opportunity, and bad governance and corruption were contributing causes to a wide variety of conflicts in Africa.



CONFLICT

- **Terrorism**
- **Ethnic Conflict**
- **Religious conflict**
- **Border Disputes**
- **Land Disputes**
- **Water/ Resources**
- **Criminal**

Natural Resources Protection

The second priority for multilateral intelligence cooperation related to the core security issue area of natural resource protection. The Fellows emphasized that natural resources within African states are vulnerable to internal and foreign theft. Some of the root causes for theft and illegal exploitation of natural resources includes lack of legiti-

mate economic opportunities for citizens to develop resources, as well as the lack of government authority, oversight, and incentives to encourage developing natural resources. The Fellows also noted that the lack of economic development in Africa resulted in governments being unable to collect revenues for use in improving infrastructure, health care, education, and social programs.



RESOURCE PROTECTION

- **Maritime Security**
- **Illegal Fishing**
- **Oil smuggling “bunkering”**
- **Illegal Mining**
- **Poaching**

Medical Threats and Crime

Another core security area identified for cooperation was medical threats from a wide variety of infectious diseases that are debilitating to African society. Medical threats to health also included fraudulent medical doctors who are illegally practicing medicine, a lack of water sanitation, and environmental pollution spilling across borders. A related issue area was drugs, which include legal and illegal narcotics. The group noted that the linkage of criminal networks to the smuggling, financing, and distribution of illegal narcotics was a transnational issue that has spread across borders and contributes to drug abuse, crime, and poverty. The group emphasized that to combat drug-related crime, African governments need to implement more pharmaceutical regulation, narcotics control, and law enforcement measures. Finally, the group noted that the proliferation of small arms and light weapons across African borders facilitates lawlessness and retards social and economic development.



MEDICAL

- **Threats**
 - AIDS/HIV
 - Malaria
 - TB
 - Ebola
 - Polio
 - Guinea Worm
- **Resources**
 - Infrastructure
 - Water Sanitization
- **Environment**



DRUGS

- **Pharmaceuticals**
- **Drugs that Expire**
- **Hazard of Drug Abuse**
- **Narcotics**
 - Smuggling
 - Financing
 - Drug barons
- **Criminal Networks**
- **Medical Frauds (quacks)**



SMALL ARMS/ LIGHT WEAPONS

- # in Country
- Who has them: civilian/military
- Origin
- Transport
- Ammunition
- Land Mines
- Financing
- Types



Dr. Pauletta Otis (JMIC) facilitates discussion among a group of International Intelligence Fellows



Ms. Jackie Wilson (U.S. Institute of Peace) facilitates debate among a group of International Intelligence Fellows

GROUP 2: IMPEDIMENTS TO INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION

Group 2 had the task of articulating impediments to multinational intelligence cooperation in Africa. These Fellows also first “brainstormed” ideas, recording all suggestions regardless of merit. They then revisited the list and chose the five most significant barriers to cooperation. The group explained that barriers to cooperation exist internally within the institutions and organizations of their own individual African states. Barriers also exist externally between African countries and among regional and international organizations and governments. An International Fellow from the group suggested that some African states and foreign states, including the United States, might provide common ground to meet on an issue of mutual significance to facilitate tactical cooperation and enhance familiarity and trust.



IMPEDIMENTS TO COOPERATION

- 1. Divergent Interests**
- 2. Trust**
- 3. Infrastructure**
- 4. Interoperability/Compatibility**
- 5. Information Flow**



Divergent Interests

- **Country-specific interests**
- **Politics**
- **Public opinion**
- **Sovereignty**
- **Conflicting Interests**
 - **Bad Governance**
 - **Credibility**
 - **Corruption**
 - **Inter-organizational**
 - **Regional**
 - **International**


Divergent Interests

This group observed that principal impediments to cooperation resulted from divergent interests among African and foreign countries. One Fellow noted that each country has its own domestic and regional interests and political sensitivities that often trickle down to inhibit multinational intelligence cooperation among intelligence professionals. Likewise, African politicians are subject to being influenced by public opinion toward cooperation, especially if the cooperation involves neighboring countries and sovereignty is at issue. Other sources of pressure against intelligence cooperation come from the divergent views toward intelligence held by regional and international organizations with interests in Africa.

Lack of Trust

The International Fellows discussed various social barriers and the lack of an ethos of reciprocity within and between African states as barriers that need to be overcome in order to achieve multinational intelligence cooperation. The Fellows suggested that Africa's rich and varied customs, cultures, religions, and languages can sometimes be barriers that lead to misunderstandings among individuals, groups, and governments. In addition, a lack of factual knowledge and understanding about contemporary, as well as historical, events contribute to the lack of trust. A Fellow noted that development of

mutual acceptance and respect for the basic idea of reciprocity, in the form of quid pro quo exchanges, is among the first steps needed in developing meaningful intelligence and information exchange.




Trust

- **Social Barriers**
 - Custom
 - Culture
 - Religion
 - Language
 - Knowledge
 - History (recent events, colonialism)
 - Political/Public Support
- **Lack of Reciprocity**

Inadequate Infrastructure

The reporting Fellow maintained that a major obstacle to cooperation involved the lack of adequate resources dedicated to transportation and communications infrastructure, and to the availability of functioning equipment. Development of the African continent's transportation and communication capabilities is challenged by the magnitude of distance and terrain barriers. Scarcity of funding for personnel, equipment, and training and education are major barriers to cooperation. Related to the issue of scarcity is the problem of equipment and systems compatibility. Suitability, flexibility, protocols, and ineffective power generation methods and procedures are just a few examples the Fellows cited of basic equipment issues that in turn lead to barriers to cooperation.




Infrastructure

- **Distance/Geography/Terrain/ LOCs/ Power**
- **Capacity**
 - **Budget/resources**
 - **Human/Technical/Natural**
 - **Training-Education-Experience**
- **Equipment Issues**
 - **Compatibility**
 - **Suitability/Flexibility**

Lack of Interoperability

The International Fellows asserted that the various barriers to cooperation between and among African states include other interoperability issues besides the lack of adequate physical equipment. They cited interoperability issues such as the lack of standards for determining and assessing accountability and credibility of various sources of information. The Fellows pointed out that still other impeding factors are the result of African state and regional organization structures that lack impartiality or have inconsistent or no standards for information sharing. Also cited were organizational “cultures” which have a bias or fear of the term and practice of “intelligence.”




Interoperability

- **Equipment**
- **Accountability**
 - **To source**
 - **Of information credibility**
 - **NGOs**
- **Organizational Structure**
 - **Inconsistent/no standards**
 - **Organizational Culture**
- **Fear of “Intelligence”**
 - **Jurisdictions**
 - **Impartiality/neutrality**

Lack of Information Flow

The Fellows described several barriers to cooperation under the category of information flow. No doctrine, policy, or procedure exists to govern intelligence releasability and dissemination. A lack of standards for secure information systems, as well as for intelligence collection, evaluation, and classification might be overcome through training and education of personnel in intelligence collection management and in how to address intelligence needs at all levels, from those of collectors and analysts to leaders and decisionmakers.



Impediments to Cooperation *Cont'd*


- **Information Flow**
 - Rules of releasability
 - Matching dissemination to needs
 - Different information systems
 - Different standards of collection, evaluation and classification
 - Educational-collection needs, analysts, commanders (Specific to Environment)
 - Capability: Systems and Bandwidth
 - Training in equipment and infrastructure
 - Collection management: Requirements/needs, volume
 - Access to information at appropriate level



Dr. Pickert, Professor Fidas, Dr. Garst (JMIC Provost), and Professor Wiant evaluate the International Fellows' presentations

GROUP 3: INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION — THE WAY AHEAD


The final group was tasked to describe the current state of information-based cooperation as they understood it through the Fellows Program. Secondly, they were asked to provide a vision of where cooperation in Africa should be in the year 2015. Finally, they were asked to list steps needed to bridge the gap between the reality of cooperation today and the vision of cooperation a decade hence.



Course Synthesis Exercise

Influence of the “Good Governance Cycle” on Intelligence Cooperation

The group identified good governance among African states and regional institutions as the most influential factor in determining the fate of multinational intelligence cooperation across Africa. According to the group, the vision of cooperation needs to develop and evolve in a similar manner as African regional and sub-regional organizations themselves. Overall, the group identified four factors: good governance, conflict, health, and terrorism as the current and near-future driving forces toward multilateral cooperation. The Fellows also identified as the overriding factor in developing cooperation what they termed the “Good Governance Cycle,” especially as embodied by the maturing African Union and its related institutions. The group posits that as African Union structures mature, inter-African trust will increase, thus influencing associated structures to function increasingly well. This will lead to further funding and investment from domestic and international sources, which in turn can assist in increasing African Union structural maturity.




AREAS OF CONCENTRATION

- **GOOD GOVERNANCE:**
 - **NEPAD**
 - **New Economic Partnership for African Development**
 - **APRM**
 - **African Peer Review Mechanism**
 - **AU CHARTER**
 - **Constraining Non-democratic governances**




Cycle of Visible Development and Cooperation



Note: If trust increases the funding increases. The increase of interstate and intrastate structures correlates with further funding on behalf of EU and U.S.

Conflicts

The group identified “conflicts” as the second crucial factor in influencing cooperation. The group noted that stabilization and reduction of African regional conflicts are important priorities. They expect that African civilian and military personnel will increase their participation in and “ownership of” peacekeeping operations in Africa. However, they noted that this will require increases in external logistics and financial support from foreign countries. The group also expects that the growth and maturation of the African Union’s Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) will increase trust as it achieves full membership, higher degrees of cooperation, and relevance to Pan-African security and stabilization.




CONFLICTS

- **Consequences of conflicts**
 - **Corruption must be minimized to the Development of good governance which decrease the consequences of conflict**
- **Conflict Containment and Reduction**
- **Mixture of AU/UN Missions**
 - **Continued enhancement of PKO through strengthened logistics capabilities (US and others)**
 - **PKTC**
 - **US contribution**
 - **African Partnerships Regional Capabilities**

Note: These measures will only contain conflict initially. Good governance is the key to decrease the consequences

Health

The group identified health issues as the third major area affecting multinational cooperation. They noted that education and treatment should be the primary focus areas. Education to change cultural norms, which can be facilitated through international cooperation, including information sharing, is seen as a proactive measure, while reactive measures include procuring additional medical resources and drugs.



HEALTH ISSUES

- **Education (Proactive measure)**
 - Countering social norms
 - Gov't (Internal or Interstate) Cooperation
- **Treatment (Reactive measures)**
 - Cost of Drugs
 - Availability of Drugs
 - Medical Care accessibility

Terrorism

The group viewed terrorism as a global, as well as an African regional, issue. The group noted that the impact of global terrorism on African states was already being examined and debated among African governments. The group cited the need for inter-African cooperation and outside moderating influences to combat terrorism in Africa. The group also concluded that containing terrorism in East Africa will probably result in increased terrorist activity in West Africa.


TERRORISM



- **Open Debate**
 - Influenced through Government
- **Internal Education**
 - Gov't funded programs with Middle East support (limited)
 - Consequently refutes the growth of Radical Islam
- **Greater Moderating Influence**
- **Inter African Cooperation and Moderating NGOs**

Cooperation in the Future

Next, the group moved to the question of defining cooperation in the near future. The members emphasized that the manner and rate at which African political and security institutional infrastructures mature will influence and underpin sharing and cooperation. The group emphasized that the key African institutions that will have the greatest influence on multinational cooperation are the African Union (AU) and the AU's recently formed Committee on Intelligence and Security Services of Africa. Other factors that will influence cooperation include economic growth and prosperity and assistance and funding from countries outside of Africa. The group presented the following vision of cooperation in the future:

 FUTURE COOPERATION				
	Good Governance	Conflict	Health	Terrorism
2015	Intermediate success yields new institutions Maturing market Greater economic prosperity (mid income) Greater African assertiveness	Conflict contained in all major areas Enhanced social stabilization Admittance to multinational 7 th CISSA meeting	Local production and distribution of drugs Social norms have transformed completely HIV stabilized Complete access to potable drinking water Malaria eradicated?	Counter balance relevance of extremist message and effort
2012	Increased AGOA exchange Increased Millennium Fund category Decreased trade barriers Greater influence of AU	Stand up of AU stand by force More AU mission Less UN direct involvement Continued support (not reliance) on logistics CISSA's * 5 th meeting for cooperation * Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa	Increased access to health services Increased access to potable water Malaria contained	Interstate cooperation to limit extremism through CISSA
2008	More NEPAD activity (trade barriers removed) More volunteers to APRM Increase of Joint Economic Partnership AGOA Millennium Challenge Fund	Continued Reliance on external assistance Increase exercised Train structure beginning More African participation Increased information sharing	Continued high rates of HIV due to testing and education efforts and awareness Incomplete reliance on external financing of main effort	Continued moderating influence of E. African Islam Increased inter -Africa awareness for moderating NGOs

SUMMARY

All three groups seemed to agree that in the ideal future, as African political, economic, and security institutions mature, so too will opportunities for multinational information and intelligence sharing. Areas subject to intelligence cooperation include information sharing about regional conflicts, natural resource protection, medicine and drug issues, and trafficking in illegal narcotics and small arms and light weapons. Current cooperation is constrained by divergent interests and deficiencies in mutual trust, reciprocity, infrastructures, interoperability, and information flow, as well as patterns of historical and cultural differences that can be overcome by intermediate steps. The Fellows agreed that cooperation will be influenced by good governance practices, the nature of current and future conflicts, developments in the economic and health sectors, and the spread of terrorism.



Colonel Ocran (Ghana) and Group Captain Dangana (Nigeria)



General Mackenzie (Angola) and Dr. Jim Lightfoot (JMIC)

CLOSING THOUGHTS

During the final seminar session, the International Intelligence Fellows were asked to reflect on the discussions of the previous two weeks. The program coordinator asked each Fellow to elaborate on the two most important points they absorbed during their time together. The following is a compilation of these points:

- We developed personal relations, and we examined problems and proposed solutions. This has been a good background to get together for the first time so that we can work out many issues once we are back in Africa.
- We have exchanged viewpoints and discussed the many problems with health and security in Africa at many levels. The main thing is what we are able to do in the future.
- I now know a lot more about the organizations involved with security in Africa. African military leaders have a firm grasp of the issues and there is a lot of promise. They need only little assistance from the U.S.
- I developed interpersonal relations and I saw a genuine interest by the U.S. in getting to know Africans and share in assistance...I will pass the message.
- This was a great opportunity to meet Africans and hear African priorities. Africans have become our allies in all aspects of security, but we in the U.S are ethnocentric and don't see what the Africans see. My perspective on cooperation is that it is not impossible...we can assist in the near term. Getting people together first is a good step, and goodwill exists. Each country recognizes its own obstacles which can be worked around through such cooperation.
- It was a great honor to be here...thank you to the U.S. for the opportunity. With regard to the fight in the north against our adversaries, we have problems with logistics...our mobility problems are being addressed at the Pentagon and State Department. Our connection with the JMIC is important.
- UN mission failure is perhaps due to the handling of intelligence at the operational level. You have to be able to craft a mandate by ensuring there is an information sharing ability. We need to work on confidence building missions and build trust.
- The fact that personal relations have been formed and that this is the first time that Military Intelligence officers have met together—lays a good foundation. I realized that intelligence is an important part of UN missions. I look forward to the establishment of the JMAC.
- It was a unique opportunity to be here and after two weeks there was good consensus on five priority areas. There is good will at the government and institutional levels. Intelligence and information sharing are needed for stabilization. It is important to overcome mistrust.
- It was good to see African perspectives on terrorism and also to address the importance of trust and confidence building...without it there will not be progress.

- The experience “touched my heart.” I have been to the U.S. three or four times in the past. During my first visit, no one gave us concern...but today, I saw concern by the U.S. for Africa...we have trust of the U.S. at various levels vis-à-vis various issues.
- East Africans already have a common view of certain terrorist groups that the U.S. can benefit from. It’s a holistic problem requiring a holistic approach. These guys are way ahead in multilateral intelligence sharing. The real message is may be that it’s time to see how we deal with and build upon multinational intelligence analyst-to-analyst relations.
- I had not previously interacted with Africans as a whole. It was very important to meet African officers as representative samples of countries that we will be working with. This reassures me...we in the U.S. have a narrow view of Africa. We must encourage leaders not to use just money. We have to stay alert to assist Africans who believe they can solve their problems.
- I enjoyed this experience...can’t find words to express my feelings other than it was an exceptional, rich experience. Overall, during the course I learned much from JMIC and the U.S. and African Fellows.
- It was important to articulate perspectives on security in Africa and discuss resolving regional conflicts that threaten peace in Africa. We were able to probe into the issues. The synthesis gained in the exercise working groups helped us address issues. There was exposure to the U.S. intelligence system. We will discuss this with our superiors when we get back.
- The opportunity to meet every one of you and gain trust was a huge factor... looking forward to building on this trust. I was able to see security concerns from African perspectives and can take this back to my command. I also have a better understanding of regional and UN organizations which enables me to go back with better information.
- In 1988, I was in this very classroom...Africa was then seen as a low intensity conflict (LIC) region and not given much importance at the time. This program reflects that U.S. priorities have changed....it’s not a LIC region anymore. After seeing the content of the course and the DIA perspective, we see some issues quite correctly and others not as well. There should be a meeting point. There are some issues that could not be addressed in the classroom, but when we went on the trip to various U.S. intelligence, defense, and State Department organizations, some of those issues were addressed. We’re satisfied. As to interpersonal relations; the question is how do we sustain them? We can constantly keep in touch on issues.
- This program succeeded in encouraging fellowship and creating an atmosphere for continued cooperation. The challenges ahead include the sharing of intelligence, the complexity of peacekeeping operations, and force protection issues by civilian and military personnel. We have to share intelligence for mission success...the will is necessary...we need processes in place to sustain will.

- The program must continue and expand to other African countries. Interpersonal relations are important and can help us to overcome certain obstacles with fellow Africans.



Major General Adu-Amanfoh (Ghana) presents President Clift with a farewell gift of appreciation during the symposium's closing ceremonies

EPILOGUE

In retrospect, the Fellows all agreed that the fourth iteration of the Joint Military Intelligence College's International Intelligence Fellows Program was a huge success. They valued the frank and candid comments provided by senior U.S. military and civilian leaders. The Fellows also appreciated the various perspectives on key regional security issues provided by U.S., African, and international guest speakers. The International Fellows contemplated the implications of the security challenges stemming from regional threats and causes of conflicts such as terrorism, bad governance, ethnic and religious conflicts, narcotics, poverty, health issues, and competition over

natural resources. These issues served as the catalyst for the Fellows to propose various options for intelligence cooperation. Opportunities and impediments were identified; potential solutions to bridge gaps were explored. A "synthesis" exercise elicited suggestions for "the way ahead," as the Fellows offered a unique vision characterizing cooperation now and cooperation in the future. As a product of this exercise, the Fellows identified incremental steps required to attain their vision of cooperation.



Major General Adu-Amanfoh (Ghana) announced during the symposium's closing ceremonies that the International Fellows have agreed to hold a reunion in Ghana in 2006



Group Captain Dangana (Nigeria), Colonel Hamidou (Niger) and Group Captain Zannah, Nigerian Defence Attaché to the United States

The major finding brought out in these Proceedings is that as Africa builds upon its multilateral and regional security architectures it is also now ready to evolve toward a multilateral framework for information and intelligence sharing. The current security environment encourages increased multilateral cooperation and the International Fellows repeated this theme throughout the two-week program. The Fellows agreed that increased intelligence cooperation is required to combat the complex nature of today's threats.

Throughout the two-week curriculum, the International Intelligence Fellows engaged each other in meaningful, probing, and insightful dialogue. As a result of open and honest discussions, mutual trust and understanding was established among the Fellows. More importantly, the Fellows agreed to maintain the same cooperative spirit once they returned to their respective countries, with the greater purpose of influencing their policymakers and leaders. Although Africa may not transform its security structures overnight, the participants in the fourth iteration of the International Intelligence Fellows Program made substantial progress in planting the seeds required for greater multilateral intelligence cooperation.

FAREWELL DINNER



Front Row (Left to Right):

Dr. Pacheco (JMIC), Mr. Hiponia (JMIC), Mr. Scott (CENTCOM), CDR Hugar (JMIC), LtCol Diarra (Mali), COL Shepherd (CENTCOM), Lt Col Kigotho (Kenya), MajGen Adu-Amanfoh (Ghana)

Back Row (Left to Right):

Ms. Bacon-Gonzales (State Dept.), Ms. Reece (DIA), CDR Parker (EUCOM), Col Ocran (Ghana), Mrs. Jackie Mugira (Uganda), Mr. Stejskal (State Dept), LtCol Mugira (Uganda), Col Randrianarivelo (Madagascar), Dr. Garst (JMIC Provost), Col Hamidou (Niger), Col Handouleh (Djibouti), Mr. Sassaran (DIA), Ms. Katie Kolowich (JMIC), Col Dikobe (Botswana), GP Capt Dangana (Nigeria), Gen Mackenzie (Angola)



Col Randrianarivelo (Madagascar), COL Shepherd (CENTCOM), Lt Col Kigotho (Kenya), Gen Mackenzie (Angola), Col Hamidou (Niger), LtCol Diarra (Mali), Col Dikobe (Botswana), Col Tunstall (JMIC Dean), Col Ocran (Ghana), Mr. Hiponia (JMIC)



Mr. Robinson (JMIC), Col Mugira (Uganda), Gen Mackensie (Angola), Maj Wyatt (DIA), COL Shepherd (U.S. CENTCOM JTF HOA)

BIOGRAPHIES OF SENIOR LEADERS AND U.S. POLICYMAKERS

Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby United States Navy Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby served as the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency from October 2002 to November 2005, when he retired after a distinguished 37-year military career. He held various senior leadership positions to include the Joint Staff J-2; Commander, Office of Naval Intelligence—the 57th Director of Naval Intelligence; the Director for Intelligence, U.S. Pacific Command; and Commander, Joint Intelligence Center-Pacific.



A. Denis Clift President Joint Military Intelligence College

A. Denis Clift was appointed President of the Joint Military Intelligence College in 1994. The College, in the Department of Defense, is the government's only accredited academic institution for intelligence education, awarding the Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence degree and the Bachelor of Science in Intelligence degree. In 1999, in his role as president of the college, Mr. Clift was elected to serve as a Commissioner on the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools for the term 2000-2002. In 2002, he was re-elected for the term 2003-2005.



Ambassador Johnnie Carson Senior Vice President National Defense University

Ambassador Johnnie Carson joined the National Defense University as Senior Vice President in August 2003. Ambassador Carson has been a career diplomat since 1969 and has been the ambassador to the Republic of Kenya and the Republic of Zimbabwe. He has also served as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of African Affairs and as Staff Director for the Africa Subcommittee of the U.S. House of Representatives. He is a career member of the Senior Foreign Service, Class of Minister-Counselor.



Ambassador Michael E. Ranneberger
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Africa Bureau
U.S. Department of State

Ambassador Michael E. Ranneberger has been the Africa Bureau's Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary since August 2004. Previously, he served as Special Advisor on Sudan during 2002-2004 and was the U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Mali from 1999-2002. He is the recipient of seven Superior Honor Awards from the Department and received the Presidential Meritorious Service Award. He is a member of the Senior Foreign Service with the rank of Minister-Counselor.



General Charles F. Wald
United States Air Force
Deputy Commander, U.S. European Command

General Charles F. "Chuck" Wald is Deputy Commander, Headquarters U.S. European Command, Stuttgart, Germany. U.S. European Command is responsible for all U.S. forces operating across 91 countries in Europe, Africa, Russia, parts of Asia and the Middle East. General Wald has also held senior leadership positions at Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, and on the Joint Staff as the Vice Director for Strategic Plans and Policy. He also commanded the 9th Air Force and U.S. Central Command Air Forces, where he led the development of the Afghanistan air campaign for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.



Brigadier General Paul A. Dettmer
United States Air Force
Vice Director for Intelligence, J2, Joint Staff

Brigadier General Paul A. Dettmer is currently the Vice Director for Intelligence, J2, Joint Staff in Washington, D.C. He is responsible for intelligence support to U.S. warfighters, the Joint Staff, Combatant Commanders, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. His distinguished military career includes senior leadership positions at U.S. Air Forces, Europe, the National Security Agency, and the Defense Intelligence Agency.



Ambassador John Dinger
Deputy Coordinator for Counterterrorism
U.S. Department of State

Ambassador John Dinger assumed his duties as Deputy Coordinator for Counterterrorism in August 2003. He serves in the Senior Foreign Service as a career member with the personal rank of Minister Counselor. Prior to his present position, he served as Ambassador to Mongolia from 2000 to 2003. Ambassador Dinger has also served in numerous diplomatic assignments in Johannesburg, Tokyo, Sapporo, Fukuoka, and London.




Dr. Jeffrey (Jeb) Nadaner
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations
Office of the Secretary of Defense

The office Dr. Nadaner directs is the Pentagon's lead for peace operations, disaster relief and humanitarian affairs, and post-major combat phase reconstruction policy. Before becoming Deputy Assistant Secretary for Stability Operations in August 2004, Dr. Nadaner served as Special Assistant to the Under Secretary Defense for Policy, Douglas J. Feith. During 2003, Dr. Nadaner was Senior Advisor in the State Department's Bureau of International Organization Affairs working on strategic planning, multilateral policies, and the United Nations.



Theresa Marie Whelan
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense

Ms. Whelan currently serves as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Her office is responsible for Department of Defense policy for all of Sub-Saharan Africa. Ms Whelan brings to her position fifteen years of experience in the defense intelligence and defense policy communities, including twelve years focusing on African issues. Her prior positions in the Office of the Secretary Defense include those of Senior Program Director for the U.S./South Africa Joint Defense Committee in 1997; Countries Director for Southern Africa from 1994 to 1997; and Countries Director for West Africa from 1991 to 1994.



General George A. Joulwan, USA (Ret)
Former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

General Joulwan's distinguished military career includes senior leadership assignments as Commander of both U.S. Southern Command and U. S. European Command, and as the 11th Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. He established the first-ever strategic policy for U.S. military engagement in Africa. He was the overall military commander for the NATO-led Implementation and Stabilization Forces (IFOR/SFOR) that implemented the Dayton Peace Accords. In addition to two combat tours in Vietnam and leadership positions at all levels in the U.S. Army, he served as Special Assistant to the President of the United States and as Executive Officer for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. He currently leads a strategic consulting company, One Team, Inc., as President.



Major General William L. Nash, USA (Ret)
Director of the Center for Preventive Action
Council on Foreign Relations

Major General William L. Nash, USA (Ret.) is the John W. Vessey Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations. General Nash has extensive experience in peacekeeping operations, both as a military commander in Bosnia and as a civilian administrator for the United Nations in Kosovo. General Nash's distinguished 34-year career in the U.S. Army included service in the Republic of Vietnam and Operation DESERT STORM in Iraq. General Nash is a Military Consultant for ABC News and is the author of two books, *The Laws of War: A Military View* and *Can Soldiers be Peacekeepers and Warriors?*



Colonel Daniel T. Morris, USA (Ret)
Associate Director of Intelligence
U.S. Central Command

Mr. Morris has been the Associate Director of Intelligence, U.S. Central Command, since September 2002. He serves as the Director of Intelligence representative to the Air Staff and other policy-level organizations for intelligence requirements. He conducts executive-level coordination with offices in the Department of Defense, Intelligence Community, and other Combatant Commands. He also works with industry and academia. During his military career, he held senior intelligence leadership assignments at the U.S. Central Command, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, and U.S. Special Operations Command.



**His Excellency, Dr. Zac Nsenga
Rwandan Ambassador to the United States**

Ambassador Nsenga has been Ambassador to the State of Israel, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark and now the United States, with concurrent accreditation to Brazil, Mexico and Argentina as well as the Bretton Woods institutions. He studied and graduated from Makerere University Medical School-Uganda with a degree in Human Medicine and from the University of Westminster with an MA in Diplomatic Studies and a certificate in Strategic Studies. He practiced medicine in Uganda and Lesotho before joining the Rwandese Patriotic Army in 1990. The Ambassador has also served as Secretary-General in the Ministry of Internal Security in Rwanda where he oversaw the National Police and Prison Services.



**Ambassador David H. Shinn
Adjunct Professor
The George Washington University**

Ambassador Shinn is a career diplomat, having served as both the U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia and Burkina Faso. Besides his ambassadorships, his distinguished career has included positions as: Director for East African Affairs in the U.S. Department of State; State Department Deputy Task Force Director and Coordinator for Somalia; Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum, Sudan; Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Yaounde, Cameroon; and the Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Nouakchott, Mauritania. Currently, Ambassador Shinn is an Adjunct Professor at the George Washington University where he teaches courses on Africa.

**Brigadier General François Dureau, France (Ret)
Director, Situation Centre, Department of Peacekeeping
United Nations Headquarters**

Brigadier General François Dureau has been Director of the Situation Centre in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) at the United Nations Headquarters in New York since January 2002. His current responsibilities include monitoring day-to-day developments by providing a 24-hour communication link among senior staff members at Headquarters, field missions, humanitarian organizations and Member States through their diplomatic missions in New York. He previously served for over 30 years as an officer in the French Army in various staff and field positions.

Colonel Nicholas Seymour, United Kingdom
Chief, Military Planning Service
Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations

Colonel Nicholas Seymour is seconded from the UK Army as Chief of Military Planning in the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. He is an armor officer and has commanded a Regiment equipped with Challenger tanks. Colonel Seymour has served in Europe, the Far East and North America. He has also seen operational service in Operation DESERT STORM as a planner with the U.S. Army VII Corps and with SFOR in Bosnia Herzegovina. Prior to his current appointment, he served as the Military Advisor in the UK Permanent Mission to the United Nations.

Mr. Mark Malan
Director, Conflict Prevention, Management,
and Resolution Department
Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Ghana

Mark Malan is the Director of the Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution Department at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Accra, Ghana. Prior to this appointment in February 2004, he headed the Training for Peace Programme at the Institute for Security Studies in Pretoria, South Africa where he supported indigenous Southern African capacities for participation in peacekeeping and peace-building missions. He has written extensively on regional security and peacekeeping issues in Africa. Mr. Malan is a retired Lieutenant Colonel in the South African Army.

